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 1.  METHODOLOGY: Research for this work included a blend of publically available Service 
literature and the author’s lifetime of experience working in and out of government, especially in the 
Service, in tax law practice, public accounting and academe, at high and low places. Not coming as a 
stranger to the Internal Revenue Service’s past and present field operations was absolutely 
indispensable. 
Throughout this Article, the Internal Revenue Service (or IRS) will be alternately referred to as the 
Service. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Three IRS truths are certain: (1) No IRS problem can be solved if it’s 
not talked about; (2) it’s not too late for the IRS to reestablish a better way 
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to do its business in the field with a principled return to business-like, 
senior-executive, state-based “on-site oversight”2; and (3) the IRS’s 
capacity to avoid blunders will rise markedly with a “phased-in” 
rebalancing and decentralizing field architecture—preceded by a “pilot,” 
spotlighting realigned and rehoused RRA ‘983 stovepiped field “units.”4 
 
 2.  The term “on-site oversight” was coined and first used by Frank Wolpe in an earlier 
publication. See Wolpe, infra note 47, at 7. 
Awkwardly lost by a 1998 ill-conceived organizational restructuring, hopelessly flawed by 
foreseeable dysfunction and followed with calls for reform by this author, a TIGTA March 28, 2016 
report, a National Taxpayer Advocate 2014 Report and other public pleas for corrective actions to 
restore trust in the Internal Revenue Service. See Press release, Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, An Ongoing Challenge: Implementation of the Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (April 15, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/press/press_tigta-2016-09.htm. The press release revealed that the TIGTA report found, among 
other things, that many “goals of the law [RRA ‘98] have remained substantially unrealized.” The 
author of this Article sees that insightful conclusion as closely associated in principle with the 
Restorative and Reform Recommendations of this Article. The recommendations of both writings are, 
therefore, compatible with the mutual objective of achieving more effective tax administration.  
In its page 2 Synopsis, the report noted that the RRA ‘98 required changes to transform the IRS into 
a modern financial institution. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS, 2010-IE-R002 THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPLEMENTED BUT CHALLENGES 
REMAIN (2010), available at https://www.treasury.gov/Tigta/iereports/2010reports/
2010IER002fr.html [hereinafter TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL, CHALLENGES REMAIN]. These 
changes included maintaining a taxpayer-focused organizational structure. See id. In the IRS official 
Response, it noted: “The blueprint for our customer based organizational structure, with four main 
operating divisions, remains the foundation for IRS today.” See IRS Still Lags on 1998 Reform, 
IRSLOGICS, http://www.irslogics.com/news/irs-lags-1998-reforms/. Yet, that hopelessly flawed 
foundation is in large part what needs fixing today; so, as with other construction work, it would be 
best to fix the foundation first before proceeding with other changes! On a more hopeful note, the IRS 
response also conceded that the Service was open to bringing about “business-like transformational 
change”; and that, of course, is exactly what this Article seeks to achieve. See id. 
If truth be told, those four perennially disputed stovepipes were always more of a problem than their 
marketing as a transformational solution in 1998, despite effusively defensive protestations to the 
contrary; so they too should be early candidates for a more business-like transformational change. 
 3.  See generally Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 
(1998). 
 4.  STOVEPIPE DEFINED: Notably, what the “compliance break-up” did, without any 
meaningful utility, was to engineer a multi-year, painful and contrived division of a “sui generis,” 
single-compliance function at the National Office, while eliminating the benchmark cohesive Classic 
District Office. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL, CHALLENGES REMAIN, supra note 2. (detailing 
organizational changes and describing stovepipe as: “In a stovepipe operation, functional units such 
as taxpayer services, exam, collection, appeals, and counsel implement their own priorities and 
objectives, which often are disconnected from the other functions and organization as a whole.”). 
Ignoring a generally accepted model, the IRS in 1998 charged backward nevertheless. Even though 
it never achieved a justified betterment for the agency, it was arranged to be done by law on the 
specious assumption that vastly dissimilar standards, services and “tax laws” applied to each taxpayer 
“unit” of: (1) wage and investment earners; (2) small business/self-employed earners; (3) large 
business and international earners; and (4) tax-exempt and government earners. Of course, they are 
uniquely all the same, except for progressive size and complexity; and that progressively led to one 
4
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This Article thus offers an achievable, breakthrough opportunity and 
turn-around framework for, at long last, restoring public and employee 
support as well as renewed public trust in the Internal Revenue Service. It 
identifies an ill-conceived, massively centralizing, 1998 structural 
reorganization and a “compliance break-up/division,” which moved the 
Service backward to an “unnaturally” isolating, four-way segregation of 
field operations. In a few words, a both centralizing and dividing, 
mammoth misstep greased the way for the IRS’s ongoing “downward 
slide.” As a knowledgeable observer might descriptively conclude: “The 
bigger the blunder, the harder it falls!”5 
Politically neutral in this matter, this Article paves a bipartisan 
pathway to addressing a wrong-headed, 1998 solution to a non-existent, 
structural problem by introducing a post-2016 proposal for overdue 
restoration and reform accompanied by a returning and decentralizing IRS 
local presence across the nation. 
In a nutshell, this Article proposes an IRS National Office 
consolidation (helpfully slimming it down), coupled with a return to 
decentralization (helpful for bulking up field operations). That means 
bringing back proven field “on-site oversight” by ending, at long last, the 
counterproductive 1998 ban against the field deployment of field-trained 
and experienced senior executives. In 2017, that would mean a joyous 
homecoming for a greatly updated successor structure to the 1952-1998 
style Classic District Office, which was the best architecture the IRS ever 
enjoyed. In the 1998 climate of the time, they had been naively and 
arbitrarily simply eliminated, viz. bumped-off. 
 
of the best career ladders for upward mobility into more responsible and interdisciplinary, 
professional jobs. Alas, with stovepipes, that wonderful career ladder was blindsided; and it 
evaporated! This Article seeks to have its integrity restored. For “Watching the Painful Birth of four 
(4) Divisive, Overrated Stovepipes,” see, infra, note 80, which explains how each became a contrived 
operating division that was walled off by other segregating fiefdoms.  
STOVEPIPE “CUSTOMER” APPROACH CRITICIZED: Disagreeing with a division of customers 
into stovepipes, former Commissioner Sheldon Cohen was critical of the plan because of its failure 
to acknowledge that, compared to private industry, the IRS worked differently. See Eric A. Lustig, 
Book Review: Many Unhappy Returns: One Man’s Quest to Turn Around the Most Unpopular 
Organization in America, by Charles O. Rissotti, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 563, 568 (2006). Likewise, 
Professor Calvin Johnson viewed the customer-centered approach as a failure to comprehend the 
adversarial nature of the system. See id. at 566. See also, Leonard & Rubin, infra note 43. In the past, 
when local problems surfaced, every District Director, the Commissioner’s representative, met with 
Mayors and/or Governors. Who does that now? No one locally!  
“ON-SITE OVERSIGHT” DEFINED: Since the phrase is used extensively in this document, we 
begin with a reference to oversight by President Woodrow Wilson, who wrote, “Quite as important 
as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration . . . .” See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 297 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1885). 
 5.  Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). 
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Adoption of this proposal, therefore, could lead to a splendid boon to 
both the agency and the wider population with refreshingly modern and 
modestly sized, new 2017 Hybrid Field Executive Offices (Hybrid FEOs) 
for renewed, local presence, accountability and executive “on-site 
oversight.”6 
  The 1998 second-rate, highly centralized restructuring was, at best, 
a bad idea masterfully executed. At worst, it was a bad idea oversold, 
overrated, underperforming and hierarchically making the IRS an overly 
staffed Washington headquarters with an inexcusably understaffed field 
structure. More to the point, its architects had scrapped a perfectly good 
field structure by eliminating locally accountable “Classic District 
Offices” and replaced them with a headquarters-heavy (and field-light) 
bureaucracy of disruptive, divisive and impractical stovepipes. 
All in all, the 1998 ill-conceived restructuring can be seen for what 
it always was: reversible error and a treatable self-inflicted wound. It 
happened just as prophesized long ago by the Brookings Institution, 
countless “independent-minded” Service insiders and a host of IRS 
veterans. Consequently, post-1998 operations actually did get worse; the 
downslide was mostly invisible to the taxpaying public; and all that’s 
unacceptable!7 Why? Because visible and constructive change is what the 
people want; and they should have their say too! 
Lest we forget, restoring trust in the Internal Revenue Service is not 
necessarily to make it a beloved tax collector but for it to be universally 
respected and acknowledged as an institutionally distinguished public 
 
 6.  DEFINING AND ADVOCATING THE “HYBRID FIELD EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
(FEO)”: The purpose of the future Hybrid FEO is to restore an accountable, grassroots geographic 
footprint and local presence. It’s a merger of stovepipe field-layers and pre-1998 Classic District 
Office architecture. It’s also a blended Hybrid because the FEO adroitly rehouses and embeds, but 
does not alter, stovepipe field-layers (called “units” in the RRA ‘98). Akin to merging, blending into 
an FEO captures the best of before and after structures. As such, it could never be referred to as “one 
size fits all.” The result is a solid system of rebalanced field operations with field “units” still tied into 
National Office program authority, but also subject to Field Director line authority for senior-
executive “on-site oversight.” Perceptively, the National Taxpayer Advocate also speaks favorably 
about restoring local presence and “modifying” the current structure. The countless beneficiaries 
would be the families of wage earners, big and small businesses and all other taxpayers as well as IRS 
field workers and the agency itself, the Internal Revenue Service. 
“TAXPAYER SERVICE: The IRS Has Developed a Comprehensive “Future State” Plan That Aims 
to Transform the Way It Interacts with Taxpayers, But Its Plan May Leave Critical Taxpayer Needs 
and Preferences Unmet”; and “For the IRS to do its job well, it must start from the perspective of 
what government is about—namely, it is of the people, by the people, and for the people. The 
government is funded by taxes paid by the people. Therefore, the future state vision of the IRS needs 
to be designed around the needs of the people.” NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANN. REP. 
TO CONGRESS, v. 1, 3, xvi. 
 7.  See Donald Kettl, The Battle Over Fixing the IRS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (1998), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/winter-governance-kettl. 
6
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servant with a sense of fair play, independence and competence. For high-
level, presumptive change-makers to advance this objective and make a 
difference, they will now have to think differently and act resolutely. 
To help them in the process, what’s proposed in this Article for 2017 
is enriched by it being so different from 1998 because it’s non-disruptive 
and helpful. Moreover, this time around, positive change can be visibly 
pro-active but still delivered as absolutely helpful, friendly and easily 
assimilated. 
Let’s be clear; much of what is now being done with stovepipes is 
marginally acceptable, even though far too many seasoned insiders 
angrily protest that it’s miles from good enough! 
Let’s also be clear that another thing to be overcome is the 
complicating fact that mere incremental change is now rigidly positioned 
as central to the IRS’s daily menu. Unfortunately it’s also, for all intents 
and purposes, sadly invisible to the national taxpaying public at large. For 
any makeover to work for everyone and thusly become meaningful, 
change must also be perceived as visible. And, we all know that public 
perception is often just as important as reality. So, as skilled as 
incremental change may be, the current variety is only understood by a 
few inside players and knowledgeable outside professionals; and that’s 
not good enough to restore trust! 
On the other hand, what’s proposed here is a meaningful public 
outreach designed to be inspirational and so engineered to be a widely 
welcomed, albeit gradually implemented, careful plan, prudently 
preceded by a pilot program. 
This way, each new step, year after year thereafter, can be equally 
celebrated as forward motion. That’s a form of direction that will not only 
do away with our current downward slide, but will inspire an uphill climb. 
And that, without skipping a heartbeat, gradually restores public trust. 
In Part II, this Article sets out a detailed introduction to what became 
a self-destructive, 1998, structural reorganization. Part III provides a 
historical overview of senselessly abandoned Classic IRS District Offices, 
as well as insight into how decentralized Classic Districts had provided a 
much more taxpayer-responsive, and management-responsible, structure 
for customer-centric services and bottom-up, senior-executive 
accountability. Part IV addresses how, during the 1996 Congressional 
Commission deliberations and the 1997 Senate Finance Committee 
hearings, a demonstrably naïve, new, IRS management team of tax 
outsiders and consultants disregarded longstanding operating realities and 
wrecked the IRS’s best-ever organizational structure with their outsider’s 
self-proclaimed vision of a stovepipe-pipedream. Part V considers the 
7
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perils of sticking with the current “status quo” in the post-2016 period. 
Part V also provides findings about how 1998 restructuring quickly 
transported the Service, without field operational “on-site oversight,” into 
the unforgiving world of undetected and unmonitored, field-level failures. 
Part VI with restorative and reform recommendations describes this 
Article’s proposal to fix the ongoing, post-1998 mess. Part VII focuses on 
hopefully getting to bipartisan (Democrats and Republicans or 
Republicans and Democrats) working together on at least this one issue. 
Finally, Part VIII deals with avoiding a new normal with a long-sick IRS. 
It also sums up the multiple virtues of reuniting an Internal Revenue 
Service “House Divided Against Itself.” 
II. TRUTH IS REALLY STRANGER THAN FICTION: HOW THE IRS WAS 
SIDETRACKED BY NAIVELY, UNAWARE OUTSIDE CONSULTANTS AND A 
SIMILARLY SITUATED NEW COMMISSIONER, WHO SWAPPED A PROVEN 
1952-1998 IRS CLASSIC FIELD STRUCTURE IN EXCHANGE FOR AN 
EXPERIMENTAL, NEVER-JUSTIFIED, SELDOM ATTEMPTED AND RARELY 
SUCCEEDING8 1998 STOVEPIPING-PIPEDREAM. 
Fixing what was heedlessly broken long ago in 1998 has regrettably 
become today’s makeover imperative simply because no one, circa 1998, 
asked for or secured the pro-bono opinion of those who knew better—
independent, prophetic and knowledgeable, inside/outside experienced, 
IRS players. 
One particularly harmful misstep was the fabrication of overly 
centralized power in a headquarters National Office, stunningly without 
the nationwide local presence of field-based, senior-executive “on-site 
oversight.” 
Its architects had scrapped a perfectly good structure by eliminating 
bottom-up, locally accountable “Classic District Offices” and replacing 
them with a headquarters-heavy (and field-light) “functional structure” of 
four never-justified and counterproductive, divisive stovepipes.9 Since 
 
 8.  “Seldom attempted and Rarely Succeeding” is a slightly modified quotation from a Booz 
Allen Hamilton IRS marketing brochure. Their exact words were: “Seldom attempted and rarely 
succeeds.” See Tax Collection for a New Era, infra note 20. 
 9.  FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE DEFINED: A functional structure is one that consists of 
commonly recognized private sector functions within an organization. They include production, 
marketing, human resources, and accounting. See Functional organization, CAMBRIDGE ONLINE 
DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/functional-organization (last 
visited June 17, 2016). Within the pre-1998 IRS, there was a single compliance function, both 
nationally and naturally and within each District Office, effectively structured for local line authority 
over groups for office audit, field examination for big and small taxpayers, investigating suspected 
criminal activity, collecting from late payers and customer service, etc. Notably, all such activities 
8
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it’s easier to break things than build them, second-class stovepipes had in 
quick-order destructively and disruptively replaced a cohesive, 
longstanding, never-tarnished, fine, first-class structure. Compounding 
the blunder, the stovepipe replacement was deceptively marketed as a 
superior, geographically remote, National-Office-dominating structure. 
With heedless disregard, a posse of outsiders imposed unheard of, remote-
absentee command and control over day-to-day IRS field operations—the 
most important part of daily tax administration. Their move stretched like 
an easily broken rubber band from a remote National Office to 
geographically scattered sites to limited-purpose, small, often unattractive 
field offices run by stand-alone, non-executive, front-line, group 
managers (often stretching by hundreds or thousands of miles from any 
IRS senior executives). 
While IRS agents, revenue (collection) officers, and other field 
workers still reported to their same line bosses, such group managers now 
reported to other, higher managers at posts of duty far removed from 
taxpayer/customers. Moving still further away, mid-level field managers 
now reported, without reference to geography, to a muscle-bound, out of 
touch National Office headquarters. Very quickly, headquarters became 
so big and redundant, it functioned only at two speeds: slow and slower. 
Ironically, many of these new National Office team players had 
never worked in classic field operations, so they understandably never 
anticipated the entirely predictable reaction. What happened was seething 
employee and retiree outrage, which was quite naturally spawned by the 
closure of such strongly performing Classic District Offices. Reinforcing 
those feelings was the distressing reality that stovepipes were by 
comparison so feebly performing, hierarchical and remote National Office 
fiefdoms. 
 
were already separately organized within each Classic District Office. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
ANN. REP. OF THE COMM’N OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1952 58-
78 (1953). Yet, the 1998 outside efficiency experts “salami-sliced” these local compliance functions 
into their brand of four nation-wide, top-heavy stovepipes, eliminating any local cohesive structure. 
Of course, all they did was to reshuffle the deck of cards so that it became a senseless new practice 
for a National Office to assert command and control over each day-to-day, nation-wide, IRS activity. 
See IRM § 1, 1.2.40. (1999), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/irm_01-002-040.html. 
It follows, therefore, that it served no useful purpose to unnaturally stovepipe-slice the taxpayer base 
into big vs. small, for profit vs. not-for-profit, civil vs. criminal, and national vs. international. 
Furthermore, what made this even more unnatural was that most jobs in each stovepipe require the 
same basic and advanced, professional skills, which progressively provided a career ladder to 
increasing opportunities. In short, everyone was already specialized; and all that separated them was 
just increasing levels of responsibility and specialization, complexity and training. That was until the 
big restructuring of 1998 messed a lot of this up.  
Finally, needless functional restructuring encouraged over-emphasis on Stovepipe Divisional goals. 
9
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Rather quickly, as should have been anticipated, a host of 
stovepiping missteps and design flaws burst onto the horizon. From 1998 
onward, the ultimately isolated, field workforce lost its one-team, agency-
wide esprit de corps because of the stovepipe-narrowing flow of Service-
wide information and training. 
Isolated like heat within a plumber’s pipe, each stovepipe (despite 
small incremental fixes) is even today fundamentally open only to up-
down movement of people and information through its long narrow 
stovepipe shell, which inhibits or prevents full, cross-functional activity. 
Accordingly, this Article examines fallout from such missteps, which 
ultimately led, like a straight arrow, to a huge IRS scandal: the 2013 
Cincinnati Tax-Exempt fiasco.10 Alas, in the wake of that mess, what we 
have now is no less than an exceptional, one-time opportunity for a 
forward-looking fix, which would pave a level off-ramp away from that 
still-pulsating Cincinnati episode. Cincinnati was, after all, very much 
attributable to an unexplained and unworkable, post-1998 absence of a 
senior-executive field presence and eliminated “on-site oversight.” The 
best, clear-cut solution—a refreshingly new, District Office successor, 
“Field Executive Office (FEO)” run by a “Field Director.” 
The task for now, therefore, is to gradually move away from a 
stovepipe bad-fit for IRS field operations to an already statutorily 
approved (i.e., RRA ‘98), structural modification11 of the existing 
structure. Thus, National Office consolidation and field decentralization, 
if adopted, would combine to rebalance the essential compliance function. 
National Office senior-executive program authority would be separated 
from line authority, which latter item would be entrusted to FEO Field 
Directors for “on-site oversight.” 
With that long awaited fix, taxpayer/customer-friendly Hybrid FEOs 
 
 10.  See, e.g., William Hoffman, 15 Years After RRA ‘98: Time to Re-restructure the IRS?, 
TAXANALYSTS (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Articles/
41E9B94207ACE35385257BC80045C346?OpenDocument.  
 11.  See Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998): 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall develop and implement 
a plan to reorganize the Internal Revenue Service. The plan shall— 
(1) Supersede any organization or reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service 
based on any statute or reorganization plan applicable on the effective date of this 
section; 
(2) Eliminate or substantially modify the existing organization of the Internal Reve-
nue Service which is based on a national, regional, and district structure; 
. . . 
 (emphasis added).  
See also Jasper L. Cummings & Alana J.J. Swirski, Interview: Charles O. Rossotti, ABA SECTION OF 
TAXATION NEWSQUARTERLY 5-9 (2013).  
10
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with Field Directors would become the field-tested, front-line Knights 
around King Arthur’s (here the Commissioner’s) Roundtable! 
Since checks and balances are so fundamental to our form of 
government, why argue against rediscovering lost, but timeless, pre-1998 
strengths for each of the two IRS, distinctively separate elements: (1) 
slimming down its now top-heavy National Office headquarters; and (2) 
expanding its vastly larger, yet now bottom-light, field operations. Since 
1998 all compliance functions have been incompatibly repackaged to 
allow the National Office to enjoy misplaced, day-to-day power over 
remote and barely observable field operations. Fixing that is the 
challenge; and repairing1998 damage is the opportunity. 
As a healthy outcome of adopting this proposal, post-2016 Field 
Directors in FEOs, based in most states, would be empowered with line 
authority (meaning “on-site oversight”) over all interdisciplinary 
(meaning cross-functional) local work and workers. Even so, most work 
would continue uninterrupted for field-friendly, Hybrid FEO-embedded, 
former-stovepipe, field “units,” which would not miss a heartbeat in their 
dealings directly with customers/taxpayers. 
The Field Director “cross-functionally” would, therefore, be cloaked 
with a “local presence” and substantially better positioning for face-to-
face “on-site oversight” over all former stovepipe field “units.” The great 
upside would be a return to local, senior-executive, daily management 
(base upon National Office policies) for examinations, collection case 
management, employee plans, exempt organizations (EP/EO), 
coordinating criminal investigations, locally delivered National Office 
training, facilities management, Human Resources, procurement, 
information systems, public affairs, inspection, among other functions.12 
Accordingly, the Service gets a “fix and mix” for post-2016, which 
includes: (1) a consolidating National Office “fix,” with delegated line 
authority for Field Directors; and (2) a decentralizing “mix,” with field-
friendly Hybrid FEO merged stovepipe “units” for examination, 
collection, taxpayer service, EP/EO and possibly criminal investigation, 
etc. 
Furthermore, much like pre-1998 Regions, post-1998 stovepipes can 
then be seen for what they have always been: ill-fated “reversible error” 
 
 12.  N.B. Incidentally, since such changes are now also favored in principle by the National 
Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), this Article also associates itself with the concurring remarks of the 
National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, who recently wrote regarding “IRS local presence,” saying: 
“The lack of a cross-functional geographic footprint impedes the IRS’s ability to improve voluntary 
compliance and effectively address noncompliance.” NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANN. 
REP. TO CONGRESS, v. 1 at 31 [hereinafter 2014 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS]. 
11
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and/or “treatable self-inflicted wounds.” So, why not reverse the 
stovepipe burden gradually, this time without self-inflicted wounds and 
disruption? 
Putting all this into order to dispose of any further doubt, here are a 
few more reasons for a down to business “fix and mix.” Although the pre-
1998 Classic District Office system was never broken in practice, 
breaking it by law was not very hard, as we shall see. Yet, every dog has 
its day, so it’s finally time for stovepipes to be reintroduced for their use 
as a messenger of IRS destruction; so, they are finally being outed as: 
 
1. Promoting an “us versus them” mentality between an all-
powerful, titanic National Office and its distant, rank-and-file, vast 
workforce; 
2. Discouraging initiative and independent thinking by that same 
workforce; 
3. Rendering anonymous and invisible essentially all IRS National 
Office decision makers while the taxpayer/customer is likely dealing 
with one of the most significant financial events of a lifetime; 
4. Removing a cross-functionally skilled, public face and leader, the 
District Director (DD) who was the direct and always available 
personal representative of the Commissioner. DD’s, of course, were 
also strategically part of the local scene of civic leaders, charitable 
boards, and state/local tax officials; 
5. Tolerating a culpable lack of “on-site oversight” without an 
effective, day-to-day, local, senior executive, who would be 
responsive and always there for the workforce, local practitioners 
and taxpayers; and 
6. Imposing essentially top-to-bottom, remote distances between 
senior management and field staff, resulting in isolation from, and 
ignorance of, other branches, co-workers and the public at large. 
 
With all that painful, but treatable, background, we are at long last ready 
for a breakaway from overpowering and underperforming centralization. 
The way forward is a post-2016, natural, National Office 
consolidation and field operations decentralization!13 Notably, in this 
 
 13.  New would be contemporary Hybrid FEO and Hybrid Campus (Service Center) job 
postings and more enriching, field-friendly workdays spent securely positioned on a rebuilt and 
exciting career ladder. 
Pre-1998, there were thirty-three District Offices, ten service centers, and three computing Service 
Centers. The District Offices and Centers (called Campuses by some) were productive, efficient and 
cross-functional. Moving up to the next tier, there were the four essentially useless and appropriately 
12
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context, it’s also the most direct path to visibly restoring trust across the 
board. Besides that, on the upside it would also be a principled journey! 
Then, getting any such proposal to bipartisan support would be a bonus 
for a worthy challenge. 
III. A PRIMER ON CLASSIC DISTRICT OFFICES 
This Part provides a historical overview of the abandoned IRS 
“Classic District Offices” as well as insight into how such decentralized 
Districts had provided a much more taxpayer-responsive, and 
management-responsible, structure. 
In Subsection A, we examine President Truman’s restructuring plan 
 
eliminated Regions. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, IRS ORGANIZATION BLUEPRINT, 
11052 (Rev.4-2000) Catalog Number 27877P (2000), at 1-10. 
Post-1998 stovepipes share one unsurprising similarity with the four pre-1998, useless Regions. It is 
their cost/benefit downside. When Regions were eliminated in 1998, it was a common-sense move, 
widely accepted by knowledgeable observers. Yet, the 1998 restructuring architects amazingly 
recreated the worst qualities of Regions with the top-end of four stovepipes. Likewise, stovepipes also 
seem to be out of touch and as redundant and wasteful as the Regions had been. The much needed 
prescription for our IRS future, therefore, is an overdue modification and realignment. 
On a pathway forward, a select group of upgraded field jobs would qualify as open, while many 
National Office jobs would be frozen or disappear. Hence, with enriching, new field jobs and career 
opportunities, a transition could be accomplished with preferences granted to existing field and 
National Office staff.  
Any thoughtful look at human resources reveals excellent candidates for Hybrid FEO senior-
executive and other appointments, thereby elevating employees from current field “units” isolated in 
stale stovepipes. The list includes: 
1.  Wage & Investment Division (W/I)—All field compliance employees, managers and 
“units” would be reassigned to Hybrid FEOs; National Office senior people would be re-
cruited for senior FEO jobs; 
2.  Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division—All field compliance employees, 
managers and “units” would be reassigned to Hybrid FEOs; all Area Directors, Territory 
Managers and Group Managers, with support staff, would comfortably fit into new Hybrid 
FEOs as senior executives, Division Chiefs and/or Branch Chiefs. Campus managers and 
staff would all remain in their “units” under the new line authority of Hybrid Campus 
Field Directors; 
3.  Large Business & International (LB&I) Division—All field compliance employees, 
managers and “units” would also be reassigned to Hybrid FEOs; National Office staff for 
technical guidance would remain in place; and field Group Managers, with support staff, 
would comfortably fit into new Hybrid FEOs as senior executives, Division Chiefs and 
Branch Chiefs; 
4.  Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division—All field compliance employees, man-
agers and “units” would be reassigned to either Hybrid FEOs or Hybrid Campuses with 
technical guidance accessible from Hybrid FEOs examination “units” and ultimately, 
Chief Counsel. 
What emerges is a twenty-first century, more effective, tax administration system. Looking back to 
1998 and then forward, anyone who knew the District Office system and surveyed the structure of the 
“just evolved” four stovepipe divisions might be reminded of the old phrase: “Oh, what a tangled web 
we weave . . . .” Sir Walter Scott, CANTO VI : THE BATTLE, in MARMION, XVII (1808).  
13
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of 1952, which was the first major, and only universally acclaimed, 
restructuring plan in the history of the IRS. Subsection B shares Truman’s 
Letters to Congress, which wisely counsel us about how to solve a 
problem in the field with a solution in the field. Subsection C highlights 
the stability enjoyed and progress made from 1952-1998, as well as the 
widespread praise IRS Classic District Offices still receive. Subsection D 
describes a door to the future for Classic District Offices (upgradeable to 
FEOs) across America (with a nostalgic look-backward and a prescribed 
move-forward to help meet tomorrow’s needs today). 
A. A Proven Idea Deserves a Post-2016, Principled, New Look (Re-enter 
President Harry S. Truman) 
It has been said that to get wherever we want to go, it is always 
helpful to know where we have been. History tells us that in the midst of 
the twentieth century, President Harry S. Truman decided that his country 
much needed a 1952, first-ever, major Bureau of Internal Revenue (soon 
re-titled as the Internal Revenue Service) reorganization plan. It came in 
the wake of an increasing, 1951-1952 public perception of warning signs 
and lost trust, like the IRS downslide now also experienced. 
As is too often the case today, some observers will blame whatever 
the problem may be on budget shortfalls and inadequate training; but 
that’s only part of the story! Others will say that the IRS no longer needs 
a presence in our communities across the nation because an “all-digital 
IRS” precludes the need for face-to-face contact. But, they’re both wrong! 
The visible need back in 1952, much like the visible need today, 
continues to be the imperative to transform the agency into an 
extraordinarily well-crafted, District Office (or FEO) system of field 
operations. With IT as a fine tool, obviously, a twenty-first century Field 
Executive Office need not be as large as in the past. Yet, what Truman 
had brilliantly latched onto was something that worked fittingly for no 
fewer than nine Presidential administrations. 
What he gave us in formal terms was the President’s Reorganization 
Plan No. 1 of 1952, whereby the Service was organized into a three-tier, 
geographically cohesive structure with a first tier, multi-functional 
National Office; second tier, half-way Regional Offices (which ultimately 
proved useless); and third tier, multi-functional District Offices (which 
ultimately proved to be the all-time benchmark for successful field 
operations).14 
 
 14.  BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1952, 17 F.R. 2243, 
66 Stat. 823 (1952). See also IRS ORGANIZATION BLUEPRINT, supra note 13, at 1-11-1-12. 
14
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In the third-tier, each District Office functioned like a large, well-
crafted, symphony orchestra, so the individual pieces all came together 
neatly as with pieces of a puzzle. There were thirty-three District 
Offices,15 ten service centers and three computing Service Centers. The 
District Offices and Centers were efficient, useful and cross-functional. 
Moving up into the second-tier, there were the four Regions. Each 
uselessly occupied space between two more important places—the 
National Office and a subset of Classic District Offices across the nation. 
The 1998 story about the Regions was that they had actually become 
unproductive half-way houses for too many people close to retirement and 
others who had just chosen to tread water or wait for retirement on the 
job. They did little beyond looking, listening and writing reports. 
Eventually, common sense, even without the 1998 restructuring, would 
have dictated that Regions, much like their successor stovepipes, had to 
go. 
On the other hand, the story of Classic District Offices was that they 
were remarkably well staffed by productive workers who never wasted a 
day. Eliminating them was tantamount to crippling the Agency; and that 
still remains as a fundamental truth! They were the engine that made the 
Service work well; and they were the pride of the agency. They 
represented the best of IRS grassroots in local taxpayer outreach, 
education and community presence—all the same things we need renewed 
today! 
Moreover, Districts also replicated a field-tested, military-style, 
organizational structure, which was more than just a coincidence because 
both institutions worked best with a cross-functional, team system. 
Notably in this context, a military formation for strategic and tactical 
military purposes, like a good IRS District Office, is a composite 
organization, which includes a mixture of integrated and operationally 
attached sub-”units” that are “field capable.” By comparison: 
 
1. The picture of Army formations traditionally includes divisions, 
brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, teams and 
squads, among others, and 
2. The picture of pre-1998 IRS formations included a National 
Office, Regions and Districts. Districts included divisions, branches, 
groups and specialized team “units”. 
 
 15.  See IRM § 1.1.2.4. District Offices were initially authorized in 1952 to have up to 70 district 
offices, but the actual number opened was fewer. In 1995 the decision was made to consolidate the 
Districts into 33 offices.  
15
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So, the Army and the Internal Revenue Service had both successfully used 
the same basic modeling to carry out their essential field missions. Yet, 
all that ended in 1998 when Classic District Office nation-wide, 
geographic cohesion gave way to segregating stovepipes, which sliced a 
“sui generis,” Classic District Office compliance function into four 
pointlessly isolating stovepipes, overstretched, from the National Office 
to the smallest city. As the old adage warns, “United we stand; divided we 
fall.”16 
B. President Truman’s Letters to Congress Wisely Counsel (for Then 
and Now) About How to Solve a Problem in the Field with a 
Solution in the Field 
Failing a most fundamental test, 1998 stovepipes were built upon the 
false premise that solving a Service problem in the field required 
effectively leaving the field by removing senior executives from the field 
and abandoning geographic cohesion. 
By contrast, our nation’s 1952 acclaimed Truman Reorganization 
solved a problem in the field with a solution in the field. It did so by 
upgrading pre-1952, local, political Collector of Internal Revenue offices 
into more meaningful, civil service, 1952-1998 Classic District Offices. 
That was done smoothly without slicing a “sui generis” compliance team 
into a pipedream of four overstretched stovepipes. That, you also might 
say, was Truman-style plain-thinking and plain-dealing. 
On the other hand, 1998 restructuring was based upon: (1) next to no 
understanding of the IRS as an agency (easily dissed by circa 1974 
decision makers); (2) even less insight into any and all forms of federal 
tax administration; and (3) a mindset that what’s stylish for certain corners 
of the private sector would be an acceptable risk for the national 
 
 16.  See Aesop, infra note 44. 
16
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government. It was not!17,18 
As Secretary of the Treasury Snyder explained, the tale of the 1952 
Reorganization was “a remarkable story of determined progress.” Since 
its success, he said, depended on understanding what had been 
accomplished, it nowadays makes sense to wistfully look back at the 
following operational description of Classic District Offices and how a 
superb corps of District Directors (DDs) operated with a cohesive team. 
Notably, their ranks included senior executives who did it all exclusively 
in the field with the charm and grace of high-level torch carriers. 
Little could any of them imagine that 46 years later, the IRS, as so 
many of us knew and respected it, would be eviscerated by the never-
 
 17.  Excerpts from Truman’s Statements and Letters to Congress in 1952: 
In his statements to Congress on January 2, 1952: “The Buck Stops Here” Harry, (also called “Give-
Em-Hell Harry”) in part, said:  
“After extensive study . . . I have decided to institute a sweeping reorganization of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue . . . . The following major changes . . . will be made: 
“All operating functions of the Bureau [soon to be renamed IRS] will be placed in . . . district offices, 
each headed by a District Commissioner . . . and [that person] alone will be responsible to the 
Commissioner in Washington . . . . 
“Bureau headquarters at Washington will be reorganized and its operating functions further 
decentralized. 
“It is my intention to make the Bureau a blue ribbon civil service career organization. I intend to make 
it a service in which all of us can place genuine confidence and have justified pride. “ 
Statements of the President to Congress About the Reorganization of the Internal Revenue Bureau, 
Harry S Truman Library & Museum (Jan. 2, 1952), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
publicpapers/index.php?pid=322&st=&st1=. 
In Truman’s subsequent message to the Congress on January 14, 1952, he said. “I transmit herewith 
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952 . . . .” He continued, in part, by noting: 
“District commissioner[s] [ultimately, called District Directors] . . . will be responsible to the 
Commissioner . . . and will have full responsibility for administering all internal revenue activities 
within a designated area . . . and service to taxpayers improved.  
“[T]he establishment of District Offices will provide opportunity in the field . . . for the development 
of high-caliber administrators with experience in all phases of revenue administration. These offices 
will be the backbone of a modern, streamlined pattern of organization . . . . The creation of this 
framework of district offices is a necessary step . . . .  
Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 1 of 1952: BUREAU OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum (Jan. 14, 1952), 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=613&st=&st1= (emphasis added). 
 18.  TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Foreword to ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1952 (including A Report to Taxpayers—
What the Reorganization Accomplished (Released Sept. 10, 1959)). 
The story that is told in these pages is one that few citizens could know if it were not made 
available by those who possess the facts. There is an important and unusual chapter in the 
history of one of our most vital agencies, the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is a remarkable 
story of determined progress toward improvements . . . . Finally, this progress would not 
have been possible without the wholehearted and unflagging encouragement and backing 
of President Truman. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
17
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justified elimination of the Classic District Office. 
C. Wistfully Looking Back at Classic Districts: Highlighting Rock-Solid 
Stability and Progress with the Artfully Woven Together and 
Unfailing Classic District Offices from 1952 Through 1998 to the 
Present 
By any calculation, knowing Districts Offices means vastly 
outclassing stovepipes. Looking back to 1998, at the moment of their 
elimination, two big questions were not likely asked or ever fully 
understood—What did Districts do, and how did they do it? Nevertheless, 
let’s try to envisage their large local footprint and how their cross-
functional operations blended at a time when they were so respectfully 
and artfully woven together by: 
 
1. A National Office setting pre-1998 administrative policy (with 
program authority), and 
2. District Offices executing that same policy with pre-1998, 
grassroots, senior executives for “on-site oversight” (with line 
authority). 
 
District Directors, who were identically organized in each location 
across the nation, represented the Service in every city and/or state. 
Among other personal virtues, carefully selected DDs were frequently the 
product of an Advanced Management Program (like at the Harvard 
Business School). Such persons quite naturally came up through the ranks 
(like military field commanders), usually from either the examination or 
the collection field functions, with years of face-to-face taxpayer problem-
solving. In other words, they were all technically tax-law qualified, 
usually accountants, and sometimes lawyers, holistically trained as 
managers and experienced at problem solving in face-to-face meetings 
with taxpayers and their representatives. Quite indispensably, along the 
way, standard cross-functional, executive development was a way of life 
for all such field-experienced managers and budding senior executives. 
Accordingly, each DD was rigorously prepared to fully represent the 
Service in every town, city and/or state of assignment. Even though 
taxpayers or their taxpayer representatives might never expect to meet the 
IRS Commissioner in Washington, D.C., each one might reasonably 
expect to meet the District Director, like an Ambassador, at local 
charitable or professional events. The pre-1998 intrinsic value of that 
proximity cannot be overstated. 
18
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Education and outreach was part of the job, so it was expected that 
each DD would become a community leader, partnering with local 
chambers of commerce and other stakeholders, emphasizing community 
service and identifying with charitable activities. DDs earned their spurs 
by being respected in their posts of duty as fair-minded, hands-on, Service 
senior executives. 
For most, becoming a District Director was proudly viewed as the 
top job in the Service, next to the Commissioner in Washington, D.C.; and 
like soccer, baseball, football, basketball and other sports team coaches 
and managers, they were a proud and competent corps of colleagues 
(similar to generals or flag officers in the military). 
A map of the United States was a map of Internal Revenue Service 
Districts. Offices were located in all major cities; and each District had 
posts of duty (PODs) located in smaller cities. 
D. In Spite of the Stultifying Stovepipe Missteps of 1998, Reinvented 
Classic District Offices are Still the Best Door to the Future Since 
They are Ideally Upgradable to FEOs for Meeting Tomorrow’s 
Needs Today 
As aptly described above, Classic District Offices performed much 
like a symphony orchestra. On the other hand, stovepipes can also be aptly 
described in musical terms as much like an ineptly unfinished symphony. 
With the former Districts, there was always great satisfaction that they 
could handle whatever came their way. On the other hand, with the latter 
stovepipes, there lingers the same old unanswered question: How do we 
finish such an awkwardly isolating structure to better adhere to 
fundamental management principles like teamwork, agency-wide esprit 
de corps, full institutional communication, interdisciplinary trailing, span 
of control, “on-site oversight”, etc.? To get the best answer, we must first 
learn more about how Districts did their jobs so well. 
In each District, there were four major divisions with smaller “units”; 
and they were essentially identical in all Districts. Each Division was 
headed by a chief who reported directly to the District Director (DD). 
They met throughout the week at set times, and other times as well, 
assembling as a cross-functional (interdisciplinary) group of chiefs and 
their senior managers to (1) maintain perspective and consistency with 
National Office policies (program authority) and (2) work as the DD’s 
core management team (line authority). 
That meant division Chiefs and unit managers from taxpayer service, 
examination, public affairs, quality review, collection, criminal 
19
Wolpe: Getting Back to the "Grassroots of Tax Administration
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
3 - WOLPE MACRO-ELI EDITS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  2:45 PM 
882 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:863 
investigation, the Taxpayer Advocate and others sat in the same room for 
staff meetings. Regular visitations and reviews by Regional Analysts 
(now better done by TIGTA—Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration) and the National Office kept them sharp, cross-
functionally communicating and singing from the same hymn book. 
As in any other well-designed organization, the best of these 
managers were immersed in essential, interdisciplinary field experience 
and were often selected for the prestigious National Office/Executive 
Development (ExD) Program to become future DDs and higher. The four 
District divisions from which they came were the: 
 
1. Examination Division: This was also alternately called the Audit 
Division (before it was stovepiped out of existence). It had capable 
and proud collegial groups of IRS Field Agents (including nationally 
trained Tax-Exempt Agents, Large Case Examiners, International 
Experts, Industry Specialists, among other groups) and Office 
Auditors, all of whom examined tax returns. Indeed, it was a 
geographically cohesive function, indisputably appreciated for its 
levels of progressive expertise and National Office training ladders 
to advancement and specialization. These folks were people with 
whom local taxpayers and their representatives met regularly at 
District Offices, businesses and elsewhere; 
2. Collection Division: This was the home of the Revenue Officer 
(RO), a highly trained professional focused upon collecting 
delinquent taxes and securing overdue tax returns. Each did research, 
interviews, investigations, analyzed financial statements and 
contacted third parties for information. They educated taxpayers on 
their tax filing rights and obligations, and they also provided 
guidance on a wide range of financial problems to assist the taxpayer 
and to resolve tax issues. As the Service’s bill-collectors, their work 
was not easy; 
3. Criminal Investigation Division: This was the police force; and its 
investigators were called Special Agents. They worked in District 
Offices as well as in Service Centers in teams or on task forces. Very 
few customers had to deal with them. They worked on the slippery 
slope of apprehension, conviction and incarceration; and 
4. Taxpayer Service Division: This was the one source of face-to-
face personal tax help where no appointment was necessary (unlike 
today where too much funding is diverted to a bloated National 
Office). Services included short-form tax return preparation from 
January 2 through April 15, account inquiries, basic tax law 
20
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assistance, solutions to tax issues and available tax forms. 
(Obviously, much of this today can be handled online but not enough 
to justify taxpayer service shortfalls). Offices were located in Federal 
Office Buildings and sub-offices across each state. 
 
Also, in each Classic District Office, there was a strategically placed 
on-site local Taxpayer Advocate Office (with dual reporting to the DD 
and National Taxpayer Advocate—NTA). Before the NTA, these 
professionals were simply IRS troubleshooters (ombudsmen) called 
“Problem Resolution Officers.” They routinely resolved issues outside 
normal channels with authority to cut red tape and get things done quickly. 
They dealt with hardships and other taxpayer grievances. In recent years, 
the NTA, Nina Olsen, has commendably and credibly elevated that 
process. 
Moreover, there were numerous other sub-groups (like a military 
Regiment) on the full District organizational chart (e.g., public affairs, 
quality review, etc.) Thus, each District was, and each FEO can also be, a 
comprehensive grassroots (viz. less remote), field-based, cohesive gem, 
almost like a miniature National Office. And, each such Classic District 
Office structure can be merged and modernized nicely with an upgraded 
and updated FEO/National Office rebalanced system for command and 
control.19 
Again, with a U.S. Army analogy, one can imagine the same kind of 
organizational chart at Fort Benning, Georgia or any other military 
installation. And, for all the same reasons as should be with the IRS, 
nobody in the armed forces would even contemplate or tolerate a remote, 
 
 19.  We ignore, for these purposes, wisely-eliminated, half-way Regions, which were at best 
redundant and at worst useless.  
Notwithstanding comprehensive quality of the District Office and its potential successor Hybrid FEO, 
there will always be some activity that requires National Office central control for obvious reasons. 
That has included such specialized matters as essential taxpayer service and professional Call Centers, 
identity theft, organized crime, selected industries and super-large case management. In many 
Districts over the years, there were also the customary Organized Crime Task Forces, all subject to 
National Office policy oversight and joint Justice Department collaboration.  
Another similar situation arises from a world gone global, not just with large corporations, but also 
with individuals. High net worth individuals have many complex structures that cross borders to 
manage their finances. High net worth individuals have always been examined by specialized groups, 
which would continue to enjoy continuous training from National Office experts. Even without 
stovepipes, the need for uniform national training will continue ever increasingly as it always has. As 
for large business and international operations, they were certainly not a new idea that showed up in 
1998. Long before stovepipes, they just had another name. They were called “large case groups,” 
manned by the best-trained specialists, also working well under DD’s. As was always the case, one 
set of executives in the National Office would decide what to do and how to do it, and another set of 
executives in the field would execute. That’s balanced; and that’s decentralization!  
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centralized Pentagon involved in day-to-day control of Fort Benning. 
Likewise, many of us cannot reasonably contemplate or rationally tolerate 
our National Office as an interloper involved in the hierarchical, power-
centric, stovepipe-top, day-to-day control of remote, local offices. 
Notice also that, in the Army, they always send their best cross-
functional and fully-vetted field generals into the field; so, why can’t the 
IRS do the same? If this proposal is adopted, one great reform would be 
the sending of a cross-functionally vetted Field Director to run each state’s 
field operations (as the Commissioner’s grassroots representative within 
Hybrid FEOs). 
IV. A STOVEPIPE-BLUNDERING PIPEDREAM LEADS IRS TO ELIMINATE 
THE HEART AND SOUL OF ITS “BUSINESS-LIKE” FIELD OPERATIONS AND 
LOSE ITS GEOGRAPHIC FOOTPRINT 
This Part addresses how, after the 1996 Congressional Commission 
deliberations and the 1997 Senate Finance Committee hearings, an unduly 
trusting and complacent Congress and demonstrably-naïve new IRS 
management team of tax outsiders disregarded realities and largely 
wrecked our tax compliance system. They were empowered, albeit with 
non-facts (so, who cared?), to fix the business without learning the 
business. 
Vaunting their outsider team’s glaring incapacities, the stage was set 
to eliminate what was not broken (Classis District Offices) and adopt what 
was pre-broken (stovepipes), which from their inception were just a 
pipedream. 
Eliminated Classic District Offices meant no less than crushing the 
heart and soul of IRS “business-like” field operations. As the consulting 
firm of Booz Allen Hamilton said: “He selected [us] in 1998 to validate 
his vision for the agency.”20 
Since the new Commissioner was imprudently engaged to make 
change, with virtually no tax or IRS foreknowledge, the evidence now 
suggests that he had to somehow concoct change. In testimony, he even 
admitted that the Classic District Office was too complex for him. Without 
knowing the business, he nevertheless set out to change the business even 
though the inner workings of the Service were clearly unknowable with 
his comprehensive IRS inexperience. 
In spite of everything, he still decided to fix what was not broken; 
and, in the process, his team of outsiders planted the seeds of the mess we 
 
 20.  See about the Commissioner’s vision at Tax Collection for a New Era, BOOZALLEN, 
http://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/media/file/100563.pdf. 
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are still harvesting! Next, in the wake of their 1998 restructuring blunder, 
they all publically celebrated and relentlessly self-proclaimed their private 
brand of success. 
What’s worse, it seemingly made little difference that their 
handiwork had led to unprecedented, post 1998 disruption and confusion. 
Eventually, the quest of many thoughtful IRS veterans and others, even 
sparked a movement for cleaning up the wreckage. 
Yet, none of this would have ever happened if it were not for an 
uninformed, rubber-stamping Congress that just naively assumed the new 
Commissioner was on the right track. Well, he was not even close! 
In Subsection A, we go back to the future to see the downside of 
1998 wrong-headed, stovepiping policy and the upside of a post-2016, 
military-style re-establishment of Truman’s brand of decentralization. 
Subsection B focuses on the circa-1998 failure to secure a qualified new 
Commissioner with indispensable experience in tax law, accounting, 
finance, and IT. Subsection C reveals how the Commission and Senate 
Committee unwittingly never understood that: (1) Classic District Offices 
were the heart and soul of IRS “business-like” field operations; and (2) 
They were of such importance that they were recognized as the public 
trademark of the IRS. Subsection D reports how four Regional, 
overstaffed offices (wastefully heavy) were replaced by four National 
Office overstaffed (top-heavy) stovepipes; and underfunding of vital field 
operations (bottom-light) became inexcusingly customary. 
As a consequence, the nation is still awaiting a Gathering of 
American Eagles to Restore Trust in the Internal Revenue Service with a 
Rebuild IRS Initiative so let’s begin to at least seriously consider: 
A. Going Back to the Future: Where We See the Downside of 1998 
Wrong-Headed Stovepiping Policy and the Upside of a Post-2016 
Military-Style Re-establishment of Truman’s Brand of 
Decentralization 
Formed in 1996 by Congress, the purpose of the ill-fated 1996 
Commission on Restructuring the IRS was to “review the present 
practices and make recommendations for modernizing and improving 
efficiency and taxpayer services.”21 
 
 21.  There was a hearing of the Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, 
July 15, 1997—as Background: “The National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue 
Service was established by Public Law 104-52. Its purpose was to review the present practices of the 
IRS and to make recommendations for modernizing and improving its efficiency and taxpayer 
services.” COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM’N ON RESTRUCTURING 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (1997).  
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Running on a somewhat overlapping timetable with the Senate 
hearings, the Commission spent a year on its project. One of the most 
revealing Commission byproducts came from Cincinnati, Ohio on March 
21, 1997. This one was not the sixteen-years-later 2013 Cincinnati 
episode, but an earlier Cincinnati event. In Appendix J of its Commission 
Report, Feedback from field hearings, the Commission noted that: 
The turnout at the field hearings was high. Although held during the 
workday, over 100 people of all ages . . . attended each hearing . . . . 
Speakers included ordinary taxpayers, accountants, enrolled agents, cur-
rent or former IRS employees, and return preparers. 
There was virtually unanimous agreement that the tax code is too com-
plex and needs to be simplified. There was broad agreement that many 
of the things that the IRS is blamed for can be laid at the feet of Con-
gress. Not a great deal of thought is given to administration . . . The as-
sumption is that . . . it can be made to work . . . .22 
Well, there it is in a nutshell. Like today, no one seemed to think 
much or care much about the grassroots of tax administration. And that, 
it turns out, was the same dangerously held consensus opinion of Main 
Treasury and Congressional senior staffers who had worked behind the 
scenes in support of the Commission and the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998. 23 
 
 22.  NAT’L COMM’N ON RESTRUCTURING THE IRS, APPENDIX J: FEEDBACK FROM FIELD 
HEARINGS (1997) http://www.house.gov/natcommirs/appj.htm (emphasis added).  
 23.  These same staffers, ten years later, offered their reflections. It was on July, 18, 2008, at a 
public event broadcast by C-Span. Tax Analysts, the publisher, had sponsored a panel discussion 
called “IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: Successes, Failures, and Consequences—The 
IRS—10 Years after Reform: What’s Working, What’s Not, What’s Next.” It was held in the Russell 
Senate Office Building. Here’s a snapshot of what was said in paraphrased-remarks (near the end of 
the telecast). Reflecting on the Senate hearings prior to the ‘98 RRA, without attributing any statement 
to any one present, these former senior staffers seemed to agree that: 
1. Again, no one seemed to care about tax administration. The entire process was undertaken 
mostly by politicians and staff tax lawyers from Treasury and the Hill; and most were there as 
tax policy people; 
2. Members of Congress and people from Treasury were reluctant to push back on any 
provisions. Amazingly, they seemed to choose provisions that were non-controversial so they 
could all just agree. Thus, the only tension in the deliberations came from whether pieces of IRS 
should be privatized. Two constant discussions revolved around making IRS user friendly and 
customer service better.  
See generally Transcript: 2008 Tax Analysts Conference, The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 
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B. The Struggle to Find an At-least Minimally Prepared New 
Commissioner 
So, along came Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin’s IT expert 
from the private sector to be somehow miraculously transformed into our 
newest full-functioning IRS Commissioner, notably without any formal 
background in law, taxation or accounting.24 
At about the same time, the agency had been steadfastly denied a 
voice at the 1997-1998 hearings. As a result, the IRS could not even 
respond to merely “isolated” examples of alleged agency misconduct (as 
judiciously recharacterized by former FBI Chief Webster in the same 
hearings).25 
Nonetheless, the IRS National Office actually did suffer two widely 
known, major areas of underperformance. It had (1) failed to keep up with 
modernizing costly information technology (IT) and (2) failed miserably 
to design and deliver necessary National Office, Service-wide training. As 
a handy-dandy distraction away from such real facts, the otherwise 
unsullied Classic District Office, was set-up to take the blame for all 
shamelessly masked National Office inadequacies. That appallingly 
paved the way for later introducing “flavor of the month” stovepipes. 
Alas, for 1998, our nation had hired an IRS Commissioner who 
simply didn’t know what he didn’t know! Some unnamed commentators 
have even suggested that hiring him was no less than inviting the fox into 
the chicken-coop. Sure, he was at the top of his game as a bright IT 
executive; but here he would preside over the IRS and a kind of work he 
had neither seen nor heard of before. Without any doubt, one thing he fully 
understood was how he built his own IT business into a family fortune 
with a tax system he expressly didn’t like.26 All these shortcomings were 
okay, of course, but certainly not for this job—not at all for this job! 
In spite of all that, with no tax background, he wasted no time in 
envisioning a radical tear-down of the agency. Using “a sledgehammer to 
crack a nut” metaphorically means to use disproportionate force to 
overcome a problem. Oddly, in this instance, that’s severely and 
regrettably descriptive! 
 
 24.  See New man at helm of IRS brings business perspective, ACCT. TODAY 3, 1997 WLNR 
7030943 (1997).  
 25.  Albert B. Crenshaw, Few Abuses Found at IRS Unit, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 1999), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/14/few-abuses-found-at-irs-
unit/f32a18b6-a61d-424d-9c9c-03eb888cb371/. 
 26.  Cummings & Swirski, supra note 11.  
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As events unfolded, the new Commissioner’s early stewardship got 
way out of hand when he and his outside consultants used that same 
proverbial sledgehammer, without any sense of open-minded due 
diligence, to outright eliminate a perfectly superior Classic District Office 
structure, which he later testified was “too complex” for him. Ugh!27 
So, despite all the flashing lights and warning signs along the way, 
the new Commissioner enjoyed clear sailing through his confirmation 
hearings.28 His vision, as he and his other outsiders often called it, would 
ultimately lead him to his pipedream of stovepiping “his,” by then, very 
own brand of a hierarchical IRS National Office. 
Yet, despite his absolute mismatch for the job in chief, there were 
other IRS crises for which the Commissioner’s skill set was perfectly 
acceptable! They were: (1) the Service’s lag in keeping up with IT, which 
was a problem correctly identified as a nut that needed cracking. The force 
to get it cracked was supposed to be the IRS’s new IT expert; and (2) the 
need to reinvent and/or revitalize National Office training for its 
professional employees. 
C. Revealing Witless Congressional Testimony, Which Bizarrely 
Portrayed Classic District Offices as Unworthy of Existence 
Looking back again to September 11, 1997, the Senate Finance 
Committee had convened its own unprecedented and ultimately 
controversial series of hearings to have its look at the Service. Lasting 
until January 28, 1998, the Senate hearings featured a strangely bipartisan 
showboating of uncorroborated testimony by tax scofflaws, some with 
fairly legitimate complaints and too many others with obviously 
implausible grievances, which unfairly made the Service seem like a 
house of horrors.29 Yet, knowledgeable Service top brass were apparently 
denied a seat at the hearings according to former Commissioner Donald 
Alexander (R-Nixon Administration), who spoke at a C-Span event.30 He 
said, about the Senate Finance Committee hearings, that they were the 
 
 27.  Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998); 
Statement of Charles O. Rossotti, Comm’r of Internal Revenue, Before the Senate Finance Comm. 
(Jan. 28, 1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-98-3.pdf. 
 28.  See David Stout, Man in the News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/04/us/man-in-the-news-charles-ossola-rossotti-hope-for-irs-in-
2000.html. 
 29.  For how uncorroborated testimony by tax scofflaws sometimes fool otherwise smart 
people, see, e.g., Thomas H. Moore, IRS Nightmares Get Senate Hearing, CNN (Sept. 24, 1997), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/09/24/irs.hearing/. 
 30.  Commissioner Alexander appeared before the C-Span event discussed. Transcript: 2008 
Tax Analysts Conference, supra note 23. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/3
3 - WOLPE MACRO-ELI EDITS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  2:45 PM 
2016] GETTING BACK TO THE “GRASSROOTS” OF TAX ADMINISTRATION 889 
“the most irresponsible exercise in the legislative process that I can think 
of; and I remember back at least 150 years.”31 
Former Commissioner Margaret Richardson (D-Clinton 
Administration) criticized the hearings and ‘98 Act as “a result of the blind 
leading the deaf.”32 Richardson was also incidentally critical of the time 
and money spent on new Commissioner Rossotti’s (R-Clinton 
Administration) reorganization plan.33 Other highly experienced and 
knowledgeable Service alumni and veterans as well concluded that the 
hearings had been riddled with flowering inaccuracies and non-facts about 
how the agency actually functioned and how taxpayers were actually 
treated.34 
Nonetheless, even with all this deserved criticism, the Congressional 
hearings had actually accomplished their hostile political purpose, 
enraging the public against the Service (so, who would complain?) and 
setting the stage for the appointment of an ill-prepared, but politically 
acceptable, top-down businessman (so, who would disagree?). As one 
might expect, with these Senate hearings as a televised backdrop, the 
arriving 1998 new team was empowered, albeit with non-facts (so, who 
cared?) with misbegotten authority to fix the business without learning the 
business (so, why not? Ugh!). 
Then, in the wake of all that someway peculiarly scripted drama, it 
was much too easy for the incoming 1998 team to blame Classic District 
Offices for what clearly had been National Office training failures. Of 
course, no District Director was invited to participate in the hearings; and 
Classic District Offices were far away, conveniently not represented and 
conveniently not positioned to defend themselves. So, Classic District 
Offices were unjustifiably erased from the IRS’s organizational charts; 
and this was the single most unforgiving result of the hearings and the 
RRA ‘98. 
Adding more fuel to the fire, there were apparently no opinion 
leaders on the 1998 Washington, D.C. scene who knew, or even cared 
much, about how well Classic District Offices actually performed. Tax 
 
 31.  Income Tax Reform, C-SPAN (July 18, 2008), http://www.c-span.org/video/?206479-
1%2Fincome-tax-reform. 
 32.  See Lustig, supra note 4, at 568. 
 33.  See id. at n. 40. 
 34.  See, e.g., Senate Panel Hears Testimony of Alleged IRS Abuses, CNN (April 28, 1998), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/04/28/irs.hearings/; David Cay Johnston, Behind I.R.S. 
Hearings, a G.O.P. Plan to End Tax Code, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/04/us/behind-irs-hearings-a-gop-plan-to-end-tax-code.html; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NEXT STEPS FOR THE IRS AFTER THE SENATE FINANCE COMM. 
HEARINGS (Sept. 1997), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-97-25.pdf. 
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administration to them was like a dime-novel mystery not worth solving. 
So, without anyone mounting a defense for one of Washington’s 
finest agencies, the die was cast. Stovepipe organizational segregation 
won the day; and organizationally integrated Classic District Offices were 
set up to fall, leaving a substantially impaired IRS. For the next four years, 
anecdotally, the agency was alternately frozen, floundering or losing 
ground. 
D. How Overstaffed Regional Offices Were Responsibly Eliminated, but 
Irresponsibly Replaced, by Four Equally Overstaffed (Top-Heavy) 
National Office Stovepipes, Causing Inevitable Underfunding for 
More Essential Field Operations (Bottom-Light) 
In Congress, for those insiders who watched the hearings on 
television, it was an essentially fact-free love-fest for the new 1998 
Commissioner without any tax background. He effusively embraced 
every Congressional member who harbored a vociferously dark image of 
the Service; and, in turn, they were eager to effusively embrace whatever 
dark measures he proposed.35 
For both the Senators and the new Commissioner, the Service was 
like a mystical and strange institution, which none of them ever really 
understood. As the Commissioner justified his new vision, he seemed to 
say that something big must have been wrong (even though he clearly 
knew not what), so something big had to be fixed. Result—all the 
Senators, sorry to say, relied upon the new guy and his visiting team. 
Later, in his testimony before the House, the Commissioner also 
confidently showboated his essentially empty talking points about a vision 
of a universal cure-all, called stovepiping (N.B. stylishly used at the time 
in IT companies).36 
Tragically, with no tax background or understanding, he believed too 
much that was simply not true. For example, he testified that stovepipes 
would lead to “fewer layers of management” when, in reality, the numbers 
of National Office bureaucrats increased because they worked on four 
“top-heavy” and segregating stovepipes requiring considerable 
administrative redundancy.37 Then, there was his other claim that the “old 
structural system was overly complex,” (which was certainly true, at least 
for him personally, as he inadvertently made clear); and it just evolved 
 
 35.  See, e.g., IRS Commissioner Questioned by Senate Panel, CNN (May 1, 1998), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/05/01/irs.hearings/. 
 36.  See Statement of Charles O. Rossotti, supra note 27. 
 37.  Id. 
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that way according to his IRS marketing publications.38 Alas, that’s how 
a complete stranger to taxation, the Service and tax administration saw 
Districts; but was he right? 
No! And he was off by 180 degrees! Classic District Offices did not 
just evolve! Oh yes, for him, understandably, it certainly was, as he said, 
“overly complex” because his visiting team of outsiders just did not 
understand this kind of public enterprise. 
Yet, ironically, what he said about it all having “just evolved” was 
perchance only half-wrong when it came to Regions. They had drifted into 
uselessness with excessive staffing over the years; so they needed to be 
eliminated and should have been a separate issue. However, he seemingly 
thought Districts and Regions had to be treated as a package. And that 
nugget of misinformation, which was a fundamentally massive mistake, 
cost the IRS, its workforce and its customers dearly! He could not have 
been more mind-bogglingly wrong! 
But, the worst damage did not begin to occur until substantial 
Regional resources were reallocated into the post-1998 National Office. 
People, operations and budgets were inevitably reallocated away from the 
half-way-house Regions into a new framework of top-heavy (and bottom-
light) stovepipes, which in too many ways replicated the dysfunctional 
role of discarded Regions. 
Most 1998 Regional personnel and funding resources could have 
been much better utilized by their shift to “modified” Classic District 
Offices. After all, “modification” was explicitly what the RRA ‘98 allowed 
as a fitting option.39 “Elimination” was sheer nonsense, especially since 
he knew not what harm he was doing and was reticent about his ignorance 
of IRS operations! 
Could it be that there really is “a sucker born every minute,” as the 
phrase commonly goes? And, maybe we are those suckers! Should the 
new Commissioner have been given a blank check when he knew so little? 
Obviously not since it’s hard to challenge a new boss, especially a 
steadfastly wrong one! Subsequently, as this truly laborious tale unfolded, 
piece by painful piece, the eviscerating of a fine, robust agency was 
torturous to unrepresented present and past IRS field-operations players 
 
 38.  See IRS ORGANIZATION BLUEPRINT, supra note 13, 1-10 (emphasis added) (“The previous 
IRS structure did not adequately support taxpayer demands. The organization structure is the vehicle 
through which decisions are made and actions carried out. The IRS structure as of September 1, 1998, 
is shown on the next page in Figure 1-2. It was built around districts and service centers, the basic 
organizational units established many years ago and evolved over decades.”). 
 39.  See Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998); 
Cummings & Swirski, supra, note 11. 
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and insiders. Yet, they never organized a public outcry because they 
thought it would be pointless. Well, this is a new day; and raising hell is 
okay for a good cause! 
V. REVISITING AND RESTARTING A 1998 LOST “BATTLE OVER FIXING 
THE IRS”40 
Alas, general barriers then and now to dealings with Washington tax 
elites still remain. For instance: (1) their limited attention span for IRS 
administrative matters; (2) the distressing lesson of the 1998 Senate 
Finance Committee hearings, which yielded grossly unreliable testimony; 
and (3) the post-2016 silent peril of IRS agency intransigence about 
moving away from the “status quo,” i.e., the devil they already know! 
However, on the brighter side, with post-2016 election changes coming, 
lingering issues like this might perchance resurface with new vigor. 
Turning back to the battle itself, in Subsection A, we learn about one 
way to do away with the downside of stale-stovepipes by 
shrinking/modifying them and rehousing their field “units.” Subsection B 
is about the “Cincinnati Episode”—a huge tale of an IRS National Office 
scandal involving senior-executive Lois Lerner. Subsection C illustrates 
that even in 1998, the Brookings Institution offered serious doubt that the 
RRA ‘98 would solve the problem—and a good chance it would make 
things “worse.” Subsection D advances the notion for post-2016 that 
sticking with the “status quo” will also make things worse. 
A. Resolving the Downside of Stale-Stovepipes: by Shrinking/Modifying 
Them and Rehousing Their Field “Units” 
Generally, one way forward inside the Congress and bureaucracy of 
Washington, D.C. is to “first inform and then reform.” That means 
educating the players and the public at large about what’s happened, how 
corrective steps can be taken, why such steps are needed and feasible, 
where a path is to be found and which stout-hearted politicians or high-
level appointees can help get it turned around. 
An IRS turn-around would generally require first learning from a 
look-back to an earlier, trouble-free time with a smaller National Office 
and a larger IRS field organization, all of which suggests that it’s helpful 
to know where we have been and then restart and rebuild from there. 
In this regard, history tells us that in the midst of the twentieth 
century, President Harry S. Truman decided that his country much needed 
 
 40.  See Transcript: 2008 Tax Analysts Conference, supra note 23. 
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a 1952, first-ever, major, IRS reorganization plan.41 It came in the wake 
of a public perception, like today, that there was trouble in the workforce 
and taxpayer service.42 
What was gained then is much like what is needed now: a business-
like structure that “reunites” the IRS compliance workforce now 
stovepiped, scattered and demoralized.43 As the adages go, “United we 
stand; divided we fall;” or, in this context, let’s reunite our IRS “house 
divided against itself”!44 
Clearly, reuniting the four 1998 “salami-sliced” stovepipes would be 
a welcome development. By thus re-securing workforce, agency-wide 
esprit-de-corps (in a new family of field-friendly Hybrid FEOs), a restored 
local presence would provide a huge step forward to garnering greater 
support from local taxpayer/customers, countless local communities and 
Washington officialdom. 
While not underestimating the twin virtues and burdens of good 
change, President Dwight D. Eisenhower (IKE), seasoned by other 
battles, counseled that: “Leadership involves persuasion and 
conciliation and education and patience. It’s long, slow, tough 
work.”45 On all those leadership virtues, IKE still rules the day. 
B. The “Cincinnati Episode”—The Tale of an IRS National Office 
Scandal Involving Senior-Executive Lois Lerner 
Consider this 2013 case-in-point: While IRS National Office 
officials slept inside a distant, 400 miles away, 1998 created, tax-exempt 
stovepipe, its weaknesses were unmasked in Cincinnati. That stovepipe, 
like the other three, was radically overrated; and its failure became a kind 
 
 41.  See BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1952, 17 F.R. 
2243, 66 Stat. 823 (1952); see also, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 42.  See Part III, supra. 
 43.  See generally David Leonard & Richard Rubin, An Emotional Audit: IRS Workers Are 
Miserable and Overwhelmed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-04-08/an-emotional-audit-irs-workers-are-
miserable-and-overwhelmed.  
 44.  “United we stand; divided we fall” is a phrase used in mottos of nations and states as well 
as songs. The basic concept is that unless people are together, they will be defeated. It is often used 
in the abbreviated form “United we stand.” The phrase has been attributed to the ancient Greek 
storyteller Aesop. See Aesop, The Four Oxen and the Lion, http://www.bartleby.com/17/1/52.html. 
A similar phrase also appears in the biblical New Testament in Mark 3:25 as “And if a house be 
divided against itself, that house cannot stand.” Mark 3:25, BIBLEGATEWAY, 
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark+3%3A25. 
 45.  EMMET JOHN HUGHES, THE ORDEAL OF POWER: A POLITICAL MEMOIR OF THE 
EISENHOWER YEARS 124, (1st ed., 1974) (quoting Dwight D. Eisehower, 1890-1969, 34th President 
of the United States (Republican, KS) Supreme Allied Commander, WWII Europe) (emphasis added). 
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of shot heard around the tax world. What followed was intense public 
scrutiny of major missteps traceable to tax-exempt, absentee senior 
executives (viz. leaderless without “on-site oversight”) in the elongated 
and remote field stovepipe “units” of the Cincinnati Service Center. 
According to news reports, that trouble started with multiple 
instances of political taxpayers from both parties potentially “gaming” our 
tax-exempt system, which was (1) invited by bad regulations, (2) 
worsened by a remote, stovepipe structure, and (3) followed by a 
bumbling IRS National Office response. Thusly, the “Cincinnati episode” 
was about to explode into an incessantly pulsating IRS scandal with a 
thunderous and continuous call for change. Indeed, this Article is part of 
that effort. 
On May 10, 2013, an IRS National Office senior executive, Lois 
Lerner, had spoken at an American Bar Association Section of Taxation 
meeting. While responding to an audience question, she voiced what 
seemed like an unsolicited admission that certain tax-exempt applications 
by political groups had been mishandled.46 Predictably, those remarks 
exploded, rightly or wrongly, into the mess in which we are still involved. 
The public call for change was immediate; and it continues. 
Just eight months later, the same ABA Section of Taxation, in its 
NewsQuarterly Magazine, Winter Issue 2014, published an Opinion Point 
abstract of this Article (from its earlier 2013 version) as its cover story.47 
It offered a robust defense of Service workers but not Lerner. It also 
inferred that censuring the workforce would not only be pointless but 
unreasonable because there was no evidence that any workers had strayed. 
With IKE’s brand of patience and persuasion, the way forward also 
means that Washington officialdom should appropriately concede that a 
central cause of the Cincinnati episode was stovepipe weakness at the 
Cincinnati Service Center. It stemmed in large part from its IRS Director 
not having appropriate line authority (viz. “on-site oversight”) over field-
based stovepipe workers. That, of course, was crippling; and it never 
would have happened if field line authority had not been eliminated in 
1998. 
Looking at 1998 still another way, the Cincinnati episode was a 
fixable, command and control, “structural disconnect” between a remote, 
centralized National Office and all-important field operations. In a sense, 
 
 46.  See Transcript: Lois Lerner’s Remarks at Tax Meeting Sparking IRS Controversy (Mar 11, 
2013), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=50160. 
 47.  Frank Wolpe, Restoring Trust in the Internal Revenue Service: Internal Revenue Service 
Aversion to Bias Backfires in Cincinnati, ABA SECTION OF TAXATION NEWSQUARTERLY 1, 6-8 
(2014).  
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/3
3 - WOLPE MACRO-ELI EDITS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  2:45 PM 
2016] GETTING BACK TO THE “GRASSROOTS” OF TAX ADMINISTRATION 895 
therefore, it was like the legal doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur,” which is 
Latin for “the thing speaks for itself.” In other words, it was a patently 
palpable, structural defect caused by the inexcusable absence of senior-
executive “on-site oversight” running field operations in Cincinnati. That 
then became a “recipe for scandal.” 
And, that recipe first went into the oven as far back as 1998, when 
local Classic District Offices and similarly organized Service Centers 
were heedlessly eliminated. Consequently, a matchless structure for early 
detection and correction of problems in the field went missing! That 
created a vacuum, which left a gap in the Cincinnati Campus internal 
control. Since nature abhors a vacuum, without Campus Director line 
authority, the public image of a trusted and well-managed Cincinnati was 
inexcusably lost. One practical way of playing “lost and found” is the 
purpose of this Article. Remembering that we are all IRS stakeholders, 
let’s face up to three reasons why the IRS image is so important: 
 
1. “There are twice as many people who pay taxes as vote; 
2. “Citizens’ faith that their government can be fair and efficient is 
dependent on a well-functioning IRS;”48 and 
3. Making matters worse, the scent of scandal breeds ill feeling; and 
ill feeling continues to be corrosive to our voluntary self-assessment 
tradition. 
 
From this widespread loss of public confidence, what we see 
emerging is an historic opportunity for systemic change. In that sense, 
let’s reconsider President Wilson’s admonition: “We are not put into this 
world to sit still and know; we are put into it to act.”49 
Yes, there are good reasons why both sides of the aisle, working 
together, can “act,” as Wilson suggested, to reshape and renew 
government. Hardly anyone denies something went wrong at the IRS; and 
after months of scandal about differing perceptions of the Service, more 
of us should finally accept the twin realities that (1) things got worse, as 
the Brookings Institution had predicted; and (2) restoring trust is firmly 
tied to substantially reestablishing a large part of what was always 
 
 48.  Statement of The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey, U.S.S., Nebraska, Testimony Before 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Report of the 
National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service (July 24, 1997), 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Legacy/oversite/105cong/7-24-97/7-24kerr.htm (emphasis added). 
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successful and never credibly eliminated. 
C. The Brookings Prognosis in 1998 
Reflecting upon the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998, the Brookings Institution issued a Research Report 
in 1998. Its author, Donald F. Kettl, called it “The Battle over Fixing the 
IRS.”50 Deferentially, since that battle is still not close to being finished, 
we are reminded of his wise words and foresight. 
In his opening, Kettl prophetically saw the future when he said that: 
In a dozen B-movies from the 1950s cowboys formed a posse, saddled 
up, and rode around shooting into the air. There was always a lot of noise 
and bad dialogue, but little real action. The battle over reforming the 
Internal Revenue Service has much the same character. There is no 
doubt that the IRS is a troubled agency that badly needs fixing, but there 
is serious doubt that the reform bill Congress is considering will do 
much to solve the problem—and a good chance it will make things 
worse.51 
Alas, he was quite right to have “serious doubt,” especially since the 
IRS walked directly into the quicksand twice by far exceeding both Blue 
Book and RRA ‘98 restructuring mandates as follows: 
 
1. Read carefully, the Congressional Blue Book merely mandated 
“end-to-end responsibility,” for “units.”52 That can best mean, in this 
context, tasking the National Office with program authority (to set 
Service-wide policy), and tasking Field Directors with line authority 
(to enforce those policies); and 
2. What’s more, the RRA ‘98 statutory mandate was to either 
“eliminate or substantially modify the existing organization”53 
 
 50.  See Kettl, supra note 7 (Tells about 1998 when the seeds for stovepipe troubles were 
planted with the mandating authority of the RRA ‘98). Brookings expressed serious concern that the 
1998 reform bill could believably do much to solve apparent problems of the time—”and a good 
chance it would make things worse.” It did! Stovepipes promises proved to be illusive.  
 51.  See id. (emphasis added). 
 52.  JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1998 
17 (Comm. Print 1998).  
 53.  See Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998): 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall develop and implement 
a plan to reorganize the Internal Revenue Service. The plan shall— 
. . . 
(2) eliminate or substantially modify the existing organization of the Internal Revenue 
Service which is based on a national, regional, and district structure; 
(3) establish organizational units serving particular groups of taxpayers with similar needs. 
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(recommending modification of Classic District Offices as an option, 
the smart choice, but never requiring elimination). 
 
So, did the Service go too far by bulldozing Districts in 1998? Yes, 
of course it did! Would a 2013 Cincinnati field-friendly Hybrid FEO 
and/or field-friendly Hybrid Service Center Campus have better delivered 
senior-executive “on-site oversight”? Yes, that’s what they do—local 
accountability. Isn’t it, therefore, likely that the entire Cincinnati episode 
(viz. the IRS Scandal) might never have happened if it weren’t for wrong-
headed 1998 abandonment of Classic District Office and Service Center 
Campus “on-site oversight”? Yes—absolutely! 
Now, faced with the mess we are still in, we are sorely reminded that 
retaining Classic Districts was the better path for a host of good reasons. 
Every RRA ‘98 change could have been less disruptively, and more 
effectively, implemented by “substantially modified” Districts. In short, 
required “units” designed to serve particular categories of taxpayers could 
have been better imbedded in Classic Districts (as is proposed here with 
Hybrid FEOs), rather than in error-prone and now outclassed stovepipes. 
Not so incidentally, those “units” can still meet RRA ‘98 tests by being 
imbedded with a soft landing in those Hybrid FEOs.54 
 
(emphasis added).  
See also JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 52. 
 54.  See Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 112 Stat 685. See also JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 
supra note 52:  
The Commissioner announced a broad outline of a plan to reorganize the structure of the 
IRS in order to help make the IRS more oriented toward assisting taxpayers and providing 
better taxpayer service. Under this plan, the present regional structure would be replaced 
with a structure based on units that serve particular groups of taxpayers with similar 
needs.  
(emphasis added) 
(Author Commentary: Rossotti concedes that the failed Regions will be replaced by stovepipes, but 
he doesn’t say how they would be better; and as events unfolded, segregation and isolation together 
with an end to “on-site oversight” and a local presence were big steps backward.) 
The Commissioner preliminarily identified four different groups of taxpayers with similar 
needs: individual taxpayers, small businesses, large businesses, and the tax-exempt sector 
(including employee plans, exempt organizations and State and local governments). Under 
this structure, each unit would be charged with end-to-end responsibility for serving a 
particular group of taxpayers. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
(Author Commentary: Since each of the four has “similar needs,” why segregate them into four 
stovepipes? He seems to be arguing against his own proposal!) 
Now consider another quote from the Blue Book: 
The Commissioner believed that this type of structure will solve many of the problems taxpayers 
encounter now with the IRS . . . . The Congress believed that the former IRS organizational structure 
was one of the factors contributing to the inability of IRS to properly serve taxpayers and the proposed 
structure would help enable the IRS to better serve taxpayers and provide the necessary level of 
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As prophesized by Brookings and countless “independent” minded 
Service insiders, things actually did get “worse”!55 In his closing remarks, 
Kettl also wrote other prophetic words. He concluded: 
On one level, of course, no change can ever truly “reform” the IRS. 
Since revolutionaries tossed English tea into Boston Harbor, Americans 
have never liked tax collectors. Trying to extract payments that taxpay-
ers really don’t want to make will never be easy or pleasant, no matter 
how strong the IRS’s commitment to friendly, solid advice. But shooting 
guns into the air is not the answer. The troubled IRS needs solid reforms 
that solve . . . real problems.56 
So, in 1998, Brookings was right; Congress had given the new 
Commissioner’s team of outsiders a proverbial blank check to fix the non-
existent problem of Classic District Offices. Since blank checks are 
frequently a big mistake, the folks running the IRS at the time heedlessly 
made things worse by giving us what became a really bad idea. Or, as 
household-stovepipe plumbers might concisely say: “Not up to code!” 
D. Cincinnati: A Bad Event, But a Good Lesson; A 1998 Washington-
Centralized IRS: Unwise Then and Worse Now 
Recognizing the need for sensitivity and responsiveness to the IRS’s 
post-2016 public plight and downward slide, the soaring question is 
whether we should any longer pay tribute to the organizational “status 
quo” by making only reactive internal adjustments (as has been done in 
recent years), essentially a defensive strategy; or do we lean forward with 
visible change the American people can see, understand and appreciate. 
Always looking for guidance, we are reminded of something President 
Ronald Reagan once told us. When asked if he wanted to keep the “status 
quo,” he responded: “I don’t think so. Status quo, you know, that is Latin 
for ‘the mess we’re in.’”57 
Consistent, therefore, with his admonition, this Article should 
 
services and accountability to taxpayers. 
Id. 
(Author Commentary: That quote is a sample of what any independent thinking IRS insider might 
have always called “Sheer Nonsense!” or some not so polite expletive.). 
 55.  N.B. Not to be missed and not so incidentally, the 1998 stovepipe project team purposely 
included other not-so-independent insiders (viz. drafted IRS mid-management, senior-executive 
employees) who were accustomed to taking orders and not disputing any incumbent Commissioner. 
 56.  See Kettl, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
 57.  Remarks by Ronald Regan at a Reception for Members of the Associated General 
Contractors of America, The American Presidency Project (March 16, 1981), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43543. 
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liberate us from those who stand for a “status quo” and stand against a 
makeover of field operations. Stovepipes were unwise in 1998 and are 
outclassed now. That is confirmed by a candid comparison of Classic 
District Offices58 to stovepipes.59 Since we should have known better, 
let’s take a moment to finally understand how stovepipes were painfully 
born.60 That should help us rediscover what Districts gracefully did; and 
how clumsily, but not irreparably, it all got lost.61 
The Service has been run with a silo/stovepipe organizational 
structure since 1998, but notably never before. Inside those top-to-bottom 
stovepipes are field workers at the bottom, like those in the now notorious, 
Cincinnati Tax Exempt stovepipe. Even from far away, anyone can see 
how the entire Cincinnati episode just demonstrates that otherwise good 
field workers can trip-up inside overrated and outclassed stovepipes. 
Nevertheless, a proud workforce aversion to anything biased seems 
to have backfired in Cincinnati for one principal reason: a bad structure 
breeding bad decisions, not bad American workers! Since the highly 
praised 1952, first-ever, Service reorganization, the unbending practice of 
field employees, managers and senior executives has been, without 
fanfare, to scrupulously prevent any misconduct, especially political 
targeting. Still, too many people today are focused on the episode rather 
than its long-term restructuring and reform solution, which rises up 
brightly like the morning sun. 
As one might expect, up until now, as if tax administration didn’t 
matter, most federal tax thought has been devoted to issues of tax policy, 
fairness and/or complexity in the law. As if disrespect for the IRS was 
tolerable, tax administration has often been ignored. People with power 
and no knowledge got listened to; and knowledgeable insiders, with no 
actual power, got ignored. The IRS can do much better. 
Nevertheless, before addressing stovepipe reversible error, there are 
two overarching questions regarding the 2013 IRS Scandal: 
 
Q: Is it in the national interest for any of our fellow citizens to believe 
their Internal Revenue Service is corrupt? 
A: The answer is, “NO, BECAUSE IT’S A BRAZEN 
FALSEHOOD.” 
Q: Can we still make some good come from a public firestorm?  
 
 58.  See BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1952; see also Part 
III, supra. 
 59.  See Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
 60.  See Part IV, supra. 
 61.  For those who never knew Districts, a plain-speaking introduction is at Part III, supra. 
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A: The answer (to borrow a political phrase) is, “YES, WE CAN!”  
 
Then, in the wake of those obvious answers, there is a third question. 
 
Q: What do you do: (a) when a top-heavy National Office (up on a 
proverbial mountaintop) has too many workers; and (b) when a field 
operation (down in the proverbial valley with the 
customers/taxpayers) has too few field workers (so it’s bottom-
light)? 
A: A single, plain-speaking answer is to discretely slim down the 
National Office and enlarge the field, especially with budgets too 
tight for much new hiring. 
 
One former Commissioner has also given relatively recent feedback. 
On October 7, 2013, Mortimer Caplin said, “That whole [1998] 
reorganization ought to be reexamined.”62 Adding to the dialogue, in early 
2014, then new IRS Commissioner John Koskinen said: “It took a little 
while to dig the hole; and it’s going to take us a little while to get out of 
it . . . .”63 
V. RESEARCH FINDINGS ABOUT HOW 1998 RESTRUCTURING 
TRANSPORTED THE SERVICE INTO THE UNFORGIVING WORLD OF 
UNDETECTED FIELD-LEVEL FAILURES 
The findings from research conducted in writing this Article indicate 
that the 1998 IRS poorly implemented a “stovepipe-pipedream.” It was a 
swaggering idea that had its birth in a fact-free arena: 
 
1. Without any reliable data about the depth and importance of a 
never-failing Classic District Office structure; 
2. Without even a modicum of reliance upon predictably negative 
consequences; and 
3. Without any trustworthy and informed opinion that Districts 
needed elimination. 
 
At worst, the pipedream was oversold, overrated, underperforming and 
 
 62.  See Michael Cohn, Former IRS Commissioner Concerned About IRS Shutdown, 
ACCOUNTINGTODAY (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/Former-IRS-
Commissioner-Concerned-IRS-Shutdown-68261-1.html. 
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hierarchical as a Washington-centralized agency, which was reckless then 
and is still an indigestible choice. Hierarchical stovepipes never did 
anything Classic District Offices couldn’t do better; and they failed to do 
what only Districts could do! 
Looking at the IRS “Future State” 2016 draft of a plan, we discover 
that the Service has yet to awaken to the need for fixing its still-flawed 
organizational structure.64 Like the Rebuild IRS Initiative and the Future 
State Initiative, there’s still time to merge their proposals for the good of 
the Service as a common goal. Their main difference is that: (1) the Future 
State Initiative advances an IRS bureaucratic (don’t rock the boat—
stovepipe) perspective; and (2) the Rebuild IRS Initiative advances this 
Article’s taxpayer-friendly, grassroots perspective.65 
Nevertheless, we think that the scale tips heavily toward the 
grassroots messaging; so, it would still be wise for the Service to at long 
last adopt the proposals of this Article, which calls for field “units” to be 
detached from stovepipes and rehoused within field-friendly Hybrid 
FEOs. Tasked as a force for good, field-friendly Hybrid FEOs, are notably 
not anti-digital; so there is room for both new worlds to enrich the process. 
Most meaningfully, FEO’s based nationwide, would undoubtedly 
overcome grassroots, lingering, taxpayer/customer mistrust and boost 
workforce morale. 
Most prominently, with robust Hybrid FEOs, the IRS can uniquely 
have local Field Directors, who are the face-to-face equivalent of 
everyone’s grassroots Commissioner. Each would preside as the top IRS 
person in every state (moving around all cities and towns). That surely 
trumps keeping so many otherwise diligent and bright workers atop 
remote, top-heavy, National Office stovepipes where their skills are less 
 
 64.  See generally IRS, IRS FUTURE STATE: OVERVIEW—THE PATH TRAVELED AND THE 
ROAD AHEAD 11-14 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/future-state-initiative. 
 65.  See Leslie Book, National Taxpayer Advocate Forum on IRS Future State, FORBES (Mar. 
2, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/procedurallytaxing/2016/03/02/national-taxpayer-advocate-
forum-on-irs-future-state-highlights-challenges-in-building-a-tax-system/#2e849d6d2147. The 
impetus for the forums was the IRS’s Future State initiative, an issue that Forbes contributor Ashlea 
Ebeling wrote about recently in her post discussing deteriorating IRS service. Ashlea Ebeling, The 
IRS’s Secret ‘Future State’ Plan to Never Talk to You Again, TRUTHREVOL (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/irss-secret-future-state-plan-never-talk-you-again. see also Charlie 
S. Clark, IRS Faulted for Future Plan to Streamline Customer Service (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://www.govexec.com/management/2016/01/irs-faulted-future-plan-streamline-customer-
service/124928/; IRS’s “Future State” Plans for Tax Services is Top Concern in National Taxpayer 
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tellingly employed. 
Around early 2014, Commissioner John Koskinen and former 
Commissioner Mortimer Caplin were not alone in calling for a fresh look 
at 1998. So let’s consider what Forbes published for a fresh look in which 
it described fixing the IRS as a “National Imperative” in its December 1, 
2014, article.66 
Next in time, one full year after the original 2014 article was 
published by the ABA (first circulated in late 2013) and one month after 
the Forbes article, Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, 
published her 2014 Annual Report to Congress.67 Warmly welcoming was 
her Conclusion, which is agreeably similar to this Article (like a 
 
 66.  Peter J. Reilly, Restoring Trust in IRS Is A National Imperative, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2014/12/01/restoring-trust-in-irs-is-a-national-imperative/. 
 67.  Each year, pursuant to IRC § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii), the NTA, Nina Olson, among other things, 
is required to identify at least twenty of the most serious problems encountered by taxpayers and to 
make administrative and legislative recommendations to mitigate those problems. High on the most 
recent list was her like-minded (parallel to this Article) conclusion to be seen in her NTA 2014 Annual 
Report as the Most Serious Problem #3—IRS Local Presence. It provided that: “The Lack of a Cross-
Functional Geographic Footprint Impedes the IRS’s Ability to Improve Voluntary Compliance and 
Effectively Address Noncompliance. See 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 31-39 
(emphasis added). This was supported by the following annotation of the Problem with Analysis. 
Problem: The Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (a/k/a RRA ‘98) 
required the IRS to replace its geographic-based structure with organizational units serving 
groups of taxpayers with similar needs. Congress mandated that the IRS change its organ-
izational structure but did not require the IRS to eliminate its physical local presence or 
centralize its employees in certain locations. While the new taxpayer based structure has 
produced some benefits, the elimination of a functional geographic presence . . . may harm 
taxpayers and erode compliance. 
Analysis: While the post-RRA 98 IRS is structured around categories of taxpayers, the 
IRS has made no real effort to tailor service or enforcement initiatives to meet the partic-
ular needs of the taxpayers based on the geographic region in which the taxpayer is located. 
Failure to maintain a local presence infringes upon the taxpayer’s right to quality service 
whereby the taxpayer has the right to receive clear and easily understandable communica-
tions from the IRS. It also infringes upon the taxpayer’s right to a fair and just tax system, 
because the taxpayer has the right to expect the tax system to consider facts and circum-
stances that might affect their underlying liabilities, ability to pay, or ability to provide 
information timely.  
National “one size fits all” service and enforcement policies for each category of taxpayer 
and the centralization of a substantial amount of IRS activity into remote “campuses” re-
sult in the IRS not addressing the particular attributes of local taxpayer populations. Fur-
thermore, centralized compliance initiatives may result in missed opportunities to identify 
and implement strategies to target locally noncompliant segments of taxpayers. The IRS 
can retain its national policy-making structure without losing the ability to respond to local 
conditions and challenges. In RRA 98, Congress did not mandate that the IRS completely 
eliminate its local presence. It only directed the IRS to reorganize in a taxpayer-based 
model. 
See Executive Summary to 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 4. 
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concurring opinion).68 The Report concluded that: 
When implementing the [1998] congressional directive to reorganize, 
the IRS should not have eliminated its local structure; [and] . . . it should 
reconsider its structure and balance the need for centralization of certain 
activities and the need for local presence in others. The IRS can modify 
the current structure to meet taxpayer needs and compliance challenges 
specific to a certain locale.69 
In the over one hundred years of our system of federal income 
taxation since 1913, there have been only two major IRS reorganizations. 
The first was the acclaimed Truman Plan in 1952, endorsed by President 
Eisenhower in 1953.70 It established senior-executive local accountability 
with a well-crafted, state-based, grassroots, local presence. 
Imposed by “edict,” IRS hierarchical stovepipes never did anything 
 
 68.  See Michael Kranish, IRS is America’s feared and failing agency, BOSTONGLOBE (Feb. 
17, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/02/17/internal-revenue-service-
institution-crisis-but-congress-fails-fix-many-problems/DxEQr3H6nEQndmbpHUtl0O/story.html. 
Kranish stated: “Nina Olson, as a sort of in-house watchdog, is supposed to tell Congress what the 
Internal Revenue Service is doing wrong. One of her reports called the IRS an institution in crisis . . . . 
The story of the IRS today is one of a powerful entity at a tipping point—under attack, distrusted, and 
underfunded, yet crucial to the nation’s survival and prosperity.” 
See also 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, which listed other concerns, such as: (1) 
this year, several points were made that reflect upon the Service’s “downward slide” including “[t]he 
emerging shape of U.S. tax administration is not encouraging for . . . taxpayers’ ‘trust’ in the fairness 
of tax administration”; (2) akin to language originating in a circulated draft of this Article in late 2013, 
it also observed that “the IRS will never be a beloved federal agency, . . . but it should be a ‘respected’ 
agency”; (3) asserting that “when there are accusations of bias or heavy-handed actions by the tax 
agency, these reinforce the already deep concerns the U.S. taxpayer bears toward taxes, such concerns 
going back to the nation’s founding. But casting the entire agency and all its employees as an out-of-
control agency in response to the actions of a few, no matter how deplorable those actions may be, is 
harmful to taxpayers and to tax compliance. We need to recognize that the IRS and its employees play 
a vital role in the economic welfare of this country. And we need to find a way to support the agency 
even as we hold it accountable for what is often a thankless task”; and (4) calling for congressional 
hearings, the NTA Report also suggested “focusing on current tax administration challenges . . . [in] 
hearings, which could address the following:  
(a) “What is the impact on taxpayer attitudes and voluntary compliance if the only 
time a taxpayer has direct contact with an IRS employee is when that employee is 
taking an enforcement action (i.e., conducting an audit or imposing a penalty, lien, 
or levy)?” 
(b) Now more than ever, Congressional involvement is needed to repair the damage 
and place tax administration in a better path forward; and 
(c) Congress, was urged “to take . . . steps . . . to conduct meaningful oversight hear-
ings into the nuts and bolts of tax administration that haven’t captured public atten-
tion in the same way as certain other issues but shape the experiences of millions of 
taxpayers in critical ways every day.” 
See Preface to 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, vii, xii, xiii, xiv. 
 69.  See 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 31-39 (emphasis added).  
 70.  See generally BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1952.  
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Classic District Offices couldn’t do better; and they failed to do what only 
Districts could do. In 1998, a team of sweet-talking outsiders, self-styled 
as “radical strategists” and licensed by a manufactured political crisis, 
masterminded a self-described “risky” stovepiping transformation. 
So smug about their mischief, they boastingly characterized their 
plan: “Of a magnitude . . . seldom attempted and rarely succeeds.”71 
Coming to feed at the public trough, strangely with a pronounced 
swagger, in that one statement they eagerly blew their own horns and 
unimaginably also conceded how such a plan “rarely succeeds.” 
In the law, we often call that an admission against interest. Indeed, 
they were at least right about that one thing—it did not succeed—which 
only spotlighted their self-proclaimed risk-taking as they toyed with our 
government’s only revenue collector. What was so truly amazing was 
their candor. 
It was to be the second major IRS reorganization, coming 46 years 
after the highly-acclaimed Truman Plan 1. Upon reading the fine print of 
the RRA ‘98’s three most threatening fault-lines, IRS alums and veterans 
were stunned. It: 
 
1. Reversed a District Director (DD) indispensable local presence; 
2. Eliminated DD “on-site oversight”; and 
3. Abandoned an enviable “field executive-development-program 
(ExD).” 
 
Yet, researching back, it is now technically clear that the new 
Commissioner’s edict to eliminate Districts was neither mandated by law 
nor, more importantly, connected to any Classic District Office 
inadequacy. That may surprise newer, present-day, senior-executive 
insiders, who understandably, as team players, have accepted this “edict 
from above” and/or never knew enough about either its controversial 
adoption or the superior Classic District Office way to do business. 
Clearly, nobody would deny that the IRS had faults, but the 1998 
team of outsiders oddly found no fault, even tangentially, traceable to 
Classic District Offices as a structure. In short, the 1998 posse did it 
because it wanted to; and that, in some circles, may be good enough. Yet, 
not here! 
Still, for now, the real mystery remains: Why the swap of Classic 
Districts for hollow stovepipes (aside from the lucrative coup of a huge 
consulting job)? In 1998, we didn’t know why a lot of smart people failed 
 
 71.  Tax Collection for a New Era, supra note 20, at 34 (emphasis added). 
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to ask for a credible explanation of why outside efficiency experts 
eliminated Districts; and after reading all the pages of quite frivolous (but, 
self-congratulatory) justifications and testimony, we still don’t know why! 
Perhaps, it just slid under the radar because it was only about tax 
administration, and Washington power brokers just didn’t care. That 
seems likely; but it still leaves us today with only the antidote—upgrading 
to field-friendly Hybrid FEOs. 
A Shakespearean analogy might explain how this happened. For a 
moment, remember Cassius, who said to Brutus, “The fault, dear Brutus, 
is not in our stars”— (here, District Offices are the stars, actually very 
bright stars) —”but in ourselves”72— (here, blaming innocent District 
Offices for a blameworthy National Office). Weren’t they the real culprit 
because they presided over weak Service-wide training, collection 
practices and examination standards? Obviously, yes! 
Lest we forget, this all began with the new 1998 Commissioner, who 
had what he called a “vision,” which might be more appropriately 
characterized as a stovepiping pipedream. Get this—he imagined an 
overly simplified, “one-size-fits-all” restructuring for top-down, 
hierarchical operations, even though the IRS already had a productive and 
refined Classic District Office structure. Moreover, feeding his “vision” 
was that cadre of 15-20 outside efficiency experts and hundreds of 
“commercial consultants” from a select consulting firm (engaged to drive, 
as they said, this “radical transition”) as follows: 
 
1. Their Job: “Validate his vision” with an extreme resolve to 
“change at every level of the organization, from front-line employees 
to top managers.”73 
 
 72.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc 2. 
 73.  Multiple quotations come from a Booz Allen Hamilton marketing brochure. See the 
reference to the Commissioner’s vision at Tax Collection for a New Era, supra note 20. 
Unhesitatingly, they said that this was “[m]ore than a simple restructuring . . . [as it] wiped away . . . 
layers of management—an average of five layers per operating unit.” Id. at 34-35. They even daringly 
called it a “radical transition” as they took their safari to redesign an entire agency with a “major 
strategy” driven by “commercial consultants” to somehow make taxpayers less “uncomfortable.” Id. 
(emphasis added). (N.B. no delivery here either). Yet, without reluctance, they even conceded that 
restructuring, like this is “seldom attempted and rarely succeeds.” Id. at 35 (emphasis added). Under 
the circumstances, that should be received only as no less than a remarkable disclosure and admission 
no one apparently noticed at the time!  
Buoyed by consultants, who had by then moved into the National Office, the Commissioner repeated 
over and over in Congressional testimony that “I do not believe there is any quick fix, silver bullet or 
low risk plan for reforming the IRS.” (Another remarkable admission.) Oversight on Restructuring 
and Reform of the IRS: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 106th Congress 1 (1999), available 
at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hrg106155.pdf.  
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2. Their Plan: Raze, reinvent and restructure (effectively to destroy 
and rebuild) IRS field operations, with fleetingly stylish stovepipes 
as a cure-all. 
 
Alas, they did their work with folders full of convenient, one-sided 
information to pick from, but with little reliance upon just knowing and 
interpreting obvious realities and relevant facts. Sadly, as events unfolded, 
the evidence against their self-congratulating jewel of an idea is still 
painfully abundant!74 If one steps back, the whole plot might even look 
like one where someone started with the result wanted (a kind of vision) 
and then the team walked backwards to concoct a series of imagined truths 
and half-truths to complete the package. In other words: The effort to fix 
National Office 1998 training and other failures by eliminating an 
imaginary villain, Classic District Offices, made as much sense as 
bombing the wrong country! 
Then, came the big marketing document, which was touted as being 
based on fact but instead relied upon grand generalities and half-truths 
pretentiously marketed as, “Modernizing America’s Tax Agency.”75 
Alas, stovepipes had swept the good and the bad away with the same 
broom (sadly, without knowing the difference). Hence, Classic District 
Offices were eliminated in 1998, not because well-informed 1998 radical 
strategists had to, but because they wanted to.76 A select few IRS senior 
 
 74.  From the beginning, with the air filled by sweeping generalizations, these radical strategists 
contended that stovepipes could do what District Offices could not do. We now know that promise 
was never fulfilled and clearly not true. Instead, their announced objectives turned out to be mere 
“excuses,” as they were occasionally characterized by Service employees. In exchange for eliminating 
districts, each principal promise remains today as something that never happened. Two of them were 
for: (1) better taxpayer service (which never happened); and (2) uniform, nation-wide taxpayer 
treatment (which could have been easily done in Districts by strengthening lax National Office 
training—the only unchallengeable reason for a lack of uniformity). Accordingly, these four new 
stovepipes were never born out of known field factors or mature field judgments. Rather, all they ever 
effectively did was to blow up the village to save the village!  
 75.  See IRS ORGANIZATION BLUEPRINT, supra note 13, in which the Commissioner 
generalized that: “[The District Office] structure no longer enabled the IRS to achieve its strategic 
goals. The cumbersome structure [and IT] . . . represented the principal obstacles to modernizing IRS 
business practices and strategies and to delivering dramatic improvements in service and 
productivity.” (emphasis added). He then put us all on notice that: “The IRS’ modernized structure is 
similar to one widely used in the private sector organized around the needs of customers, in this case 
taxpayers.” (emphasis added). Yet, a complete reading fails to demonstrate why Districts could not 
do all the same posited modernizing things guided by appropriate program authority and suitable 
uniform training driven by the National Office.  
 76.  What’s barely believable is that these dynamic novices about anything tax not only did 
whatever they wanted to do, but they successfully closed themselves off to any meaningful challenge 
by either side of the aisle or, more importantly, knowledgeable insiders, former Commissioners and 
a host of knowing former employees. In order to see just how effortlessly this ill-conceived and 
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executives were also carefully drafted to join the cohort of outside 
consultants and provide garnish to the setting while waving the flag of 
workforce unity. Needless to say, they were not actually independent 
since they knew very well the way the wind was blowing for them 
personally. Their unfortunate conflict of interest was job retention 
(including, the essential family meal ticket). Since they were all 
accustomed to taking orders from above, the result was preordained; and 
they are blameless! In other words, the only official supporters within the 
IRS were paid consultants and job-dependent career employees! 
Changing direction for a moment, it’s pleasing to note that other 
enacted, RRA ‘98, non-stovepipe measures were helpful, such as a new 
mission statement, goals for an improved workforce culture, stressing 
employee integrity, legislating innocent spouse relief and mandating 
better information technology.77 
Nonetheless, a strange thing happened on this apparent IRS top-guy 
cakewalk. Sacked from their jobs were superbly qualified District 
Directors, done in by an unequal, sports-like trade for mere stovepipes. 
Thusly, a 1998 band of outsiders, skillfully pushed out a most honorable 
corps of superbly trained District Directors; and, it simultaneously 
devalued the development of a future corps of holistically trained and 
field-seasoned senior executives (like sports coaches). 
As if this was actually a sport, even as these wonderful head coaches 
(District Directors) were taken off of the field, the visiting team expected 
to win the game. Naturally, that’s unheard of in real sports without the 
coaches; and it should also be unheard of in government. End game—real 
victory—never resulted; yet, bragging never stopped! 
Instead, what we now see is how truth and the true integrity of a good 
 
unchallenged outcome glided into place see JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 52. It reports: “The 
Commissioner announced [his outline to reorganize, quoting the Congressional Record] . . . under 
[which] the present regional structure would be replaced with a structure based on units that serve 
particular groups of taxpayers with similar needs . . . . The Commissioner believed that this type of 
structure will solve many of the problems taxpayers encounter . . . .” Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Thus, 
“The Congress supported the Commissioner,” and, for that reason alone, he was “directed to 
restructure the IRS by eliminating or . . . modifying the . . . structure [the Truman Plan] . . . with . . . 
operating units . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). N.B. modifying remains, even today, as a viable option, 
with such “units” just as easily blended or merged into Hybrid FEOs without eliminating the 
benchmark model for District-like local presence and excellence. 
As the oft-repeated adage suggests, the 1998 legislative process for IRS restructuring was no less than 
one more amazing instance of how “Laws are like sausages, [so] it is better not to see them being 
made.” Otto Eduard Leopold, BRAINYQUOTE.COM, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
quotes/o/ottovonbis161318.html (last visited June 17, 2016).  
 77.  See generally Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685; TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
CHALLENGES REMAIN, supra note 2. 
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thing (like Classic District Offices) may not be fully appreciated until they 
are lost. The leftovers look like this: 
 
1. Lost was a corps of field-tested leaders, who were District 
Directors with seasoned judgment. They had always been available 
for climbing any ladder to increase cross-functional 
accomplishments, improve field training, exercise mature judgment 
and build upon their credentials so necessary in the past for 
recruitment to a higher level of National Office assignment; 
2. Found were senior-executive candidates with much less 
credentialed, field qualifications, like Ms. Lois Lerner; 
3. Lost was a grassroots District Director job, providing 
indispensable field accountability; and 
4. Found was a flawed practice where command and control, slow 
and slower, trickled down from a muscle-bound National Office. 
VI. RESTORATIVE AND REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
Subsection A spotlights how the IRS should rebalance its structure 
with upgraded field operations. Subsection B illustrates this concept by 
applying a military analogy about how the same process of staffing field 
operations works well for both armies and the IRS. Subsection C is 
another military analogy about enjoying a more mission-fulfilling field 
experience with a more decentralized command and control structure. 
Subsection D discusses getting to “yes” with four agreeable “core ideas.” 
Subsection E considers additional reasons for change. 
A. The IRS Should Rebalance its Structure with Upgraded Field 
Operations 
It should be indisputable, at this point, that all power to an overly 
centralized National Office is not the best practice. Accordingly, the time 
has come to stop the IRS’s downward slide by rebalancing National 
Office operations with newly upgraded IRS field structures! In Wilsonian 
terms, we are here “to act”; and in Reaganesque terms, we are here to 
avoid the “status quo,” which means, be proactive to get out of the mess 
we’re in. 
Yet, there will always be nay-saying voices from cozy stovepipe 
perches in the National Office. They will send signals like: 
 
1. I like my stovepipe since I know nothing else in my limited orbit; 
2. These are hard times so let’s stay away from zealous change-
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makers who would tip the apple cart; and 
3. Training deficits and underfunding across the board are the 
Service’s only crippling problems! 
 
What they understandably fail to see is that in hard times even their 
pet-stovepipes must give way to the greater good. Indeed, that’s precisely 
why the IRS must move on this initiative. Leaders with an acknowledged, 
fiduciary responsibility to the American people simply cannot afford to 
compound structural problems by rewriting or ignoring IRS history, 
denying dysfunction or delaying restoration and reform. 
All that’s why a principal purpose of the future Hybrid FEO is to 
restore an accountable, grassroots, geographic footprint and local 
presence. As such, unlike one rap against stovepipes, FEOs could never 
be referred to as “one size fits all.” Perceptively, the National Taxpayer 
Advocate also speaks favorably78 about restoring “local presence” and 
finally “turning back the clock” to “modify” (in the original RRA ‘98 
terms) the current structure. 
Quick-fix tourniquets and sundry incremental changes alone will not 
restore the trust of a vast, taxpaying, yet troubled, voting public; and that 
should be no surprise. Everyone says, “No more 1998 tsunami-like 
messes”; and that’s the right messaging. Yet, phased-in, well-marketed, 
convincing and gradual reforms can certainly be implemented sensibly 
over a prudent period of time. Positive change should not slip through the 
cracks again and again because the IRS National Office is otherwise 
preoccupied and underfunded! After all, one way to get funding is to do 
something people like enough to invite more funding! 
Looking back again, the new 1998 Commissioner had wrongly relied 
upon one particular wrong-headed excuse in his Congressional testimony. 
Districts, he said, were just “too complex.”79 That statement, even if it 
applied only to him personally (and his team of other outsiders), was, 
however well-intentioned and naive, 180 degrees away from reality.80 
 
 78.  See, 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12. 
 79.  See Statement of Charles O. Rossotti, supra note 27. 
 80.  N.B. Parenthetically, despite today’s need for an inconvenient clean-up, it seems in order 
to reflect upon the otherwise good people on that 1998 team, including the new Commissioner. Each 
were undoubtedly well-meaning, dedicated, honest, albeit “high-risk-taking” business folks, who 
found themselves at the top of the IRS with their same private sector risk-taking habits, unsuitable for 
government revenue collection operations. Regrettably, they didn’t know the business before they 
changed the business; so the IRS became a preventable “house divided against itself” with 
counterproductive stovepipes. 
Watching the Painful Birth of four (4) Divisive, Overrated Stovepipes:  
After shutting down the Regions, next in implementation was the swap of Classic Districts in an 
unequal exchange for four contrived, artificially separate, but marketed as equal, operating divisions, 
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Here’s an interesting question: What do Hybrid FEOs have in 
common with foreign embassies? As should be expected, such Hybrid 
 
which were walled off as inherently segregating stovepipes, top-heavy and overstretched across the 
nation (referred to by some as a functional reorganization). Still in place, these overrated fiefdoms are 
called:  
(1) Wage and Investment;  
(2) Large Business and International;  
(3) Small Business/Self-Employed; and  
(4) Tax-Exempt and Government Entities.  
See AT-A-GLANCE: IRS DIVISIONS AND PRINCIPAL OFFICES, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/at-a-
glance-irs-divisions-and-principal-offices. 
With a trademark of isolation, what this break-up did most was to engineer a multi-year, unnecessarily 
painful division, which was destined to never meet its promises. What we also got were stovepipes, 
astonishingly each headed by four titled Commissioners, which, by itself, became proof of isolation. 




Stepping back to look carefully at them, an unsettling picture often comes into 
focus. As commonly described, they inherently: 
(1) Restrict the flow of information within the organization to up-down 
through vertical lines of control, (not full-functioning within the main 
stream); 
(2) Inhibit, or prevent, cross-organizational communication (isolating staff);  
(3) Operate as very hierarchical with too sharply defined roles or areas of influence (like a 
pyramid with little feedback or dissent); and 
(4) Breed a culture of suspicion (with senior executives far away, like from Cincinnati to 
Washington, D.C.). 
See also, supra note 7 and Stovepipe (organisation), WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stovepipe_(organisation) (last visited June 17, 216), which provides: 
“A stovepipe pattern can be very harmful to a commercial organisation as it can lead to duplication 
of effort in different parts of the organisation and, in extreme cases, unhealthy competition between 
different branches of the organisation.”  
As if to reinforce and underscore the above, the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), Nina Olson, 
reportedly testified at a House Committee on February 26, 2014, that the Cincinnati episode was 
contributed to by a lack of guidance to front-line employees. Hearing On Internal Revenue Service 
Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government Comm. on 
Appropriations H.R. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/
nta_testimony_houseppprops_oversight_022614.pdf, pages 11-14 (written Statement of Nina E. 
Olson). 
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FEOs would run all field operations, much like the home away from home 
of the Embassy. Likewise, the National Office, with its rediscovered, most 
fitting role, could continue to do what it does best: (1) set uniform 
standards, procedures, training and policies and (2) supervise and train 
newly titled “Field Directors,” functioning like grassroots Ambassadors. 
Furthermore, like 1998 Lost and post-2016 Found,81 what’s 
proposed here is to restore something vital that went missing. Answering 
dissenters handily, stovepipe shortcomings and field-friendly, Hybrid 
FEO virtues clearly speak for themselves—res ipsa loquitur,82—so they 
remind us of five towering reasons why no-nonsense, post-2016 Hybrid 
FEOs would altogether outclass 1998 stovepipes. On one side of the coin 
are stovepipe weaknesses and on the other side are the same weaknesses 
reversed to become “Hybrid FEO” strengths. As one might expect, those 
FEO strengths help: 
 
1. Deliver better nationally designed training for uniform, national 
taxpayer treatment by field personnel who are more closely 
supervised day to day by a top corps of field-based and technically 
seasoned, grassroots senior executives (Field Directors embedded 
closer to the taxpayer/customers they serve); 
2. Minimize management and judgment failures with closer, more 
effective “on-site oversight,” local presence and accountability, 
consistent with a rewritten and reinvigorated service-oriented 
mission; 
3. Remove structural and behavioral, stovepipe-isolating barriers to 
daily activity and progress, while gradually retiring four top-heavy 
stovepipes with redundant overhead, thereby shifting limited 
resources to more robust, Hybrid FEO, field-friendly operations; 
4. Assure improved, barrier-free, internal and external 
communications for the benefit of a more integrated workforce and 
better-served taxpaying neighbors; and 
5. Reinvent a management development program (MDP) 
traditionally called the IRS “ExD” program, which for decades 
shaped promising senior executives with maturing field experience, 
 
 81.  Lost and Found: Truman’s 1952 Plan 1, modernized for the future—We know what it is 
and why it got lost; so all we need do is decide to bring it back as found and even better than before. 
For President Harry S. Truman’s Statements of the President to Congress, January 2, 1952, and 
Truman’s January 14, 1952 Special Message to the Congress, see, supra note 17. 
 82.  See Res ipsa loquitur, DICTIONARYLAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/
Default.aspx?typed=res%20ipsa%20loquitur&type=3 (last visited June 17, 2016) (stating (rayz ip-
sah loh-quit-her) n. Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” a doctrine of law . . . .). 
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mounting field judgment, multiple FEO tours of duty and enriching 
inter-disciplinary training, all across the spectrum of functions and 
geography of Hybrid FEOs. 
 
Thus, this Rebuild IRS Initiative, pivots upon: (1) discreetly 
slimming down the National Office and (2) decentralizing field-friendly 
Hybrid FEOs to be established with line authority over former field 
stovepipe RRA ‘98 “units.” 
For such “units,” these steps end a part of their life as they knew it—
with no more remote executives, too isolated offices, overcentralized 
distances and overstretched stovepipes. In the swap, the IRS enjoys a 
restored “local presence” and “on-site oversight.” Then, in due course, it 
all happens by a process called “reverse engineering,” which ultimately 
leaves the National Office with the top-end of each current stovepipe (for 
future program authority to be enjoyed from top to bottom, Service-wide). 
These steps also entrust the new FEO Field Director with the bottom-end 
of current stovepipes (for line authority). 
After that, each Hybrid FEO, doing what it should do, occupies an 
appropriate geographic area and span of control. In turn, that enables both 
the National Office and Hybrid FEO (i.e., like its predecessor, the Classic 
District Office) to revert to what each heretofore had done best. 
In addition, discreet slimming-down and decentralizing of the 
National Office would also provide a predictably better way of allocating 
less productive, workforce resources using a much needed budget 
reallocation and reinvestment in the field workforce. It’s clear that with 
the shift to a potentially larger examination and collection field workforce, 
billions in revenue (an estimated five to seven times of cost/benefit) could 
be collected. 
B. Military Analogy #1: The Same Process of Staffing Field Operations 
Works Well for Both Armies and the IRS 
Changing direction once again, there’s a U.S. Army relevant analogy 
that works so well that it should be told. It’s a tradition of military service 
and training, which aptly provides a proud likeness for our IRS workforce. 
In the Army, it’s presumed that almost all of its people are trained as 
infantry first. Later, many become Headquarters support troops or other 
specialists. Consequently, when there is a shortage of infantry in the field, 
Headquarters support troops and others are sometimes asked to go back 
into the field to better ensure mission success. 
As is easily seen, that steadfast emphasis on the field can work well 
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for both armies and the IRS. With both groups, the highest priority of 
staffing must be singularly to achieve the most effective field operations 
as possible. After all, they are the only ones who meet and deal with their 
customers day-to-day in war and peace. That across-the-board priority in 
many ways leads to the best, agency-wide outcomes and their attendant 
agency-wide esprit-de-corps in the ranks. 
 
C. Military Analogy #2: Enjoying a More Mission-Fulfilling Field 
Experience with a More Decentralized Command and Control 
Structure. 
Similarly, one other military analogy applies to the Department of 
Defense (DOD), where its senior leaders labored hard for years before 
they tore down traditionally impenetrable silo/stovepipe walls between 
the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. As a result, there is now a better 
blended and trained fighting force with inter-service “on-site oversight” 
enjoyed by field-based, decentralized and joint commands (lead by the 
best field generals and admirals akin to the IRS’s prospective Hybrid FEO 
field-based, top senior executives). 
What the DOD learned long ago, often through trial and error (which 
the IRS can now experience vicariously), was that it’s impossible to run 
any army (or any other entity the size of an army) from a Washington, 
D.C. desktop. We not only need our best generals and admirals on the 
field of battle, but we also need them on the IRS face-to-face field of 
taxpayer/customer service and workforce cooperation. 
Like the DOD, which has already done very well at blending and 
decentralization, the IRS can be blended and decentralized—closer to its 
customers/taxpayers, with its own kind of soldier-employees working, as 
a team, within an array of “Classic,” cross-functional, organizational 
structures (viz. Hybrid FEOs). 
National Office people who had, over the years, been drawn from the 
field, could enjoy a new opportunity for return to the field with a 
reestablished, field-experienced career ladder. Other National Office 
stovepipe desk-workers, who never had that mission-fulfilling field 
experience, could also enjoy Hybrid FEO prospects and field training for 
career enhancement.83 
 
 83.  See Figure 1: Proposed Organization Chart with Field Director FEOs, infra. 
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D. Getting to “Yes” with Four Agreeable Core Ideas 
Deferentially bringing all parties to the table means successfully 
finding a common thread of agreement with everyone else’s belief system. 
Here are some ideas: 
 
1. Being against too much IRS centralization of governmental power 
in Washington is a good thing; 
2. Further erosion of our universally admired voluntary self-
assessment tax tradition is a bad thing;84 
3. Being grateful for a dedicated, competent IRS workforce; is a 
good thing, and 
4. Seeing the IRS fail in its mission to effectively and fairly 
administer the country’s tax laws is a bad thing. 
 
Beyond these Core Ideas, there are additional reasons for change.85 
Let’s begin with the first of those. 
First—The talented and caring workforce: Anyone in the Service, or 
in the vast taxpaying population, should be grateful to have such a 
fundamentally talented and patriotic workforce. They get up in the 
morning and go to work every single day; they have a sense of mission 
about them; and they simply do not understand or accept why an 
unrelated, admittedly bad performance in Cincinnati, about tax exempt 
corporations, should lead to public contempt and defunding for their entire 
agency. They are our nation’s competent and caring IRS workforce. So, 
they are just waiting for a signal about how trust in their workplace can 
be restored. 
Second—Far away field perceptions: How National Office stovepipe 
senior executives are seen by many IRS field-workers and 
customers/taxpayers. Anecdotally, that’s not so complicated either 
 
 84.  See the Executive Summary to THE TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2013 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-annual-report/
downloads/2013-Annual-Report-to-Congress-Executive-Summary.pdf, which reports on the 
significant role of trust in noncompliant behavior with our voluntary self-assessment system. It 
says: “In recent years, the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) has explored the factors influencing 
taxpayer compliance decisions . . . . For example, our surveys have shown that for the most 
noncompliant group of taxpayers (sole proprietors), trust in the government, trust in the IRS, and 
trust in the tax system highly correlate[s] with [their bad] behavior.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 85.  Most of these additional reasons come from a series of private emails and LinkedIn 
messages received by the Author. More details as to the substance of these comments can be found 
in Frank Wolpe, The Rebuild IRS Initiative: With a Bipartisan Approach to Rebalancing Management 
Stovepipes and Fixing ‘Grassroots’ Field Operations, Exhibit E, Bently University Graduate School 
(Apr. 19, 2015). 
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because their message from the field is much like that of an army foot-
soldier, who reviles certain far-away desk-generals who send soldiers into 
battle but have never been in the trenches themselves. 
Third—Messages from loyalists outside of the IRS: What happened 
to this author, without any solicitation, was an interesting flow of 
supportive messages from LinkedIn members, Forbes readers, colleagues 
and others in the form of personal/professional e-mails. From reading 
them all, it quickly became clear that there was one thing they had in 
common: their unanimous judgment that elimination of District Offices in 
1998 was incomprehensible, careless and senseless. They scornfully 
looked upon reasons advanced as incredibly unrelated excuses. The IRS 
that they knew well had been callously broken in 1998, and nobody in 
power since then seemed to know why or even care. 
One loyalist and former employee, a prominent Washington tax 
attorney, even reported how he attended a Washington, D.C. forum in 
1998 where all the top IRS players from the Executive Branch and 
Congress spoke about the sudden arrival of IRS stovepipes. As he 
reported, the meeting was cast as if stovepipes were being handed down 
from a biblical mountain on a big blank tablet. (A blank tablet in this 
context meant nothing was spoken about how stovepipes could do 
anything Classic District Offices couldn’t do.) He came away without 
learning much, but distressed, nevertheless, by his feeling that “the fix 
was in” (an odd assertion) and, more importantly, his concern that no 
official at the forum provided any logical justification for such a drastic 
change. 
Fourth—Messages from loyalists still inside of the IRS: Then came 
the luncheon talks, where past and current IRS employees rose to agree 
with most everything in this Article. There were countless anecdotes 
about what disturbingly happened in the tsunami-like implementation, 
which dragged on for some years after 1998. If more people heard their 
passion and believed only one half of what they said, after so many 
credible tales of dysfunction, calls for change would certainly multiply 
overnight. Change might even be more widely perceived as a national 
imperative. 
From notes, which captured their words, the following is a summary 
of their reflections: 
 
1. The career ladder is gone; 
2. Managers are often incompetent, and the bosses’ bosses are too 
far away and too unfamiliar with field operations to know or 
understand; 
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3. Isolation from the rest of the IRS is crushing; I deeply miss co-
workers from other groups; 
4. Quality training programs enjoyed in District Offices no longer 
exist; and 
5. The National Office has no idea of what happens in the field 
because they treat the field as if the bosses lived in a castle and we, 
in the field, were a lesser-class doing lesser-work. That is reinforced 
when National Office big-shots never visit.  
 
Fifth—Returning the National Office to what it had always done 
best: with a reunified National Office staff without stovepipes. That list 
includes: 
 
1. Selecting/evaluating/retaining/supervising Hybrid FEO Field 
Directors and Hybrid Service Center Directors; 
2. Restoring prior program authority over all Service-wide 
enforcement activities (while Hybrid FEOs have restored line 
authority) involving collections, examinations, tax-exempt 
organizations, employee plans, and possibly criminal investigations, 
among other activities; 
3. Combining program authority and line authority over the NTA, 
Chief Counsel, Appeals, On-line and Walk-in Customer Services 
and possibly Criminal Investigation, all to continue as is with 
appropriately centralized operations; 
4. Combining program authority and line authority over 
design/delivery of all national training, including the Executive 
Development Program (ExD); 
5. Enhancing the roles of TAS (the Taxpayer Advocate Service), 
VITA (Volunteer Income Tax Assistance) and the official IRS.gov 
website;86 and 
 
 86.  Two new and expansive ideas for enhancing “effective taxpayer assistance” are: (1) 
employing FEO-based VITA volunteer operations (already successful, but which can be first-time-
ever delivered “on-site and year-round”), and (2) employing FEO-based TAS services (also already 
successful, but to be delivered “on-site and year-round”). One other approach is to make the IRS 
website the most popular one offered by the U.S. government. Much to his credit, Commissioner 
John Koskinen has already done that. Yet, as important as such a service may be, it’s not enough 
for all the IRS’s constituencies. See Nick Gass, IRS.gov Tops List of Most Popular U.S. Government 
Websites, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/most-popular-us-
government-sites-116223.html. 
Next, reflecting also on “the lack of effective administrative and congressional oversight . . . ,” the 
National Taxpayer Advocate submitted her 2014 Annual Report to Congress, pursuant to Section 
7803(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code. In her opening Message, she also echoed many 
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6. Providing agency-wide support services. 
VII. GETTING TO BIPARTISAN WITH DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS, OR 
REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS, WORKING TOGETHER 
That being said, with a leading edge product like a robust Hybrid 
FEO coming to the marketplace for better servicing customers/taxpayers 
locally, the next step is to reach out for bipartisan appeal. That means a 
lot of folks working together on at least this one issue, fixing the Internal 
Revenue Service. For Republicans, the appeal might be a shift of 
resources to shrink national government and expand local services in 
home districts. For Democrats, the appeal might ironically be the same, 
with a somewhat more pronounced emphasis in one place or another. 
Either way, in diplomacy, it’s often said that we should spend more 
time talking with our adversaries than our friends. That may be true here 
as well. Let’s start, therefore, by changing the subject from kicking a flat 
tire to getting help to patch-up what we already have . . . if we can. That 
process includes: 
 
1. Political Awareness—being collaborative with big and small 
business, right and left wings, small and big taxpayers, congressional 
opponents and proponents and, very significantly, our dedicated IRS 
employees; and 
2. Persuasion—winning people over with the prospect that a fix for 
the IRS is not only good for the country, but also for their own self-
 
concerns expressed in all the versions of this Article, when she described the magnitude of the 
challenge. She said: 
We have to face up to the fact that we have an incredibly complex tax system that, by 
virtue of its complexity, creates burden, confusion, and unfairness. It is a challenge for any 
tax agency to properly administer a system such as the one we have.  
. . . 
(C)asting the entire agency and all its employees as an out-of-control agency in response 
to the actions of a few, no matter how deplorable those actions may be, is harmful to 
taxpayers and to tax compliance. We need to recognize that the IRS and its employees 
play a vital role in the economic welfare of this country. 
. . . 
The IRS will never be a beloved federal agency, because it is the face of the government’s 
power to tax and collect. But it should be a respected government agency . . . . And we 
need to find a way to support the agency even as we hold it accountable for what is often 
a thankless task.  
. . . 
Now more than ever, Congressional involvement is needed to repair the damage and place 
tax administration on a better path forward. 
See 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 12, at xiii, xii, xiv. 
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interest and constituencies. 
 
While we are at it, let’s also offer political adversaries the gift of an 
idea—this idea! If both sides of the aisle ultimately agree, at least on this 
one reform, why not grant every one of them the Hybrid FEO as a 
successful accomplishment they can legitimately call his or her own? 
I conclude this Part with a message from a left-leaning lawyer who 
wisely wrote: “I see a theme of a smaller Washington government where 
tax administration has a decentralized local face as a way to appeal to 
those on the right side of the political spectrum. It is a made-to-order issue. 





























  87.  Private Email from former IRS Official to Author (on file with author) 
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VIII. A GATHERING OF AMERICAN EAGLES TO STOP THE IRS 
DOWNWARD SLIDE BEFORE DISTRUST OF A SICK IRS BECOMES THE 
NEW NORMAL 
In Subsection A, we underscore the purpose of stopping the 
downward slide of trust in the IRS. Subsection B reiterates the need for a 
decentralized structure. Subsection C urges a move away from the “status 
quo,” which is not working well for the IRS and it customers. Subsection 
D advances the benefits to the IRS from implementing the 
recommendations herein. Finally, Subsection E is a call for change to the 
structure of the IRS in order to ultimately help the entire nation, including 
its sometimes out-of-touch Washington capitol. 
A. Action—Stop the Service-wide Downward Slide and Restore Trust 
before Distrust of a Sick IRS Becomes a New Normal 
In the aftermath of a truly stovepipe-induced Cincinnati episode, we 
are left with diminished national trust in the Service, which, without 
stemming the tide, will become a troublesome new normal. With no 
positive, publically visible and understood changes, the “downward slide” 
will continue; and that cannot be good for taxpayers, voters, political 
parties, businesses (big or small) and the IRS itself! A well-functioning 
bureaucracy actually does matter, and trust in the revenue collector is 
indispensable to our form of government. 
We debate lots of things without letting up; and then we come 
together on others. Well, this should be one of togetherness where a 
gathering of American eagles (i.e., bipartisan patriots) can help with an 
inconvenient, but necessary, clean-up! Why not plug the dike? If not this, 
what else? If not now, when? 
Has anyone ever thought about what our nation would be like without 
a working, voluntary, self-assessment system? 
B. Action—At Long Last, the IRS Should End the “Salami-Sliced” 
Operation of IRS National Office Stove-Piped Enforcement 
Activities 
In the process, the IRS should, indeed it must, rebalance the 
relationship between a bloated Washington, D.C. headquarters and its 
understaffed field operations; it must close the door on long term, ill-
fitting centralization; and it must move toward the virtues of a 
consolidated headquarters and decentralized, field-first, tax-collecting 
and service agency. It’s been said, “Big business has by now already 
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replaced autocratic rule from the top with decentralization; and 
government must do the same thing.”88 
C. Action—”Dis” the “Status Quo” to Get Out of the Mess We Are In 
This is also one of those times when both changing the subject and 
bipartisan publically visible change-making can work well together. Thus, 
consolidating the National Office (by slimming it down) and 
rehabilitating field operations (by fully restoring them) with feasible, 
field-friendly Hybrid FEOs provides a dynamic off-ramp from the so-
called ongoing IRS scandal—all in the public interest. 
Even so, one might fully expect proponents of the “status quo” to 
circle their wagons. First in line might well be a powerful cadre of job-
protecting, National Office senior executives who would likely portray 
the currently second-rate stovepipe set-up as perfect (just like their 
predecessors did in 1998). So, they might say, if we would only tweak this 
or that small flaw, all would be okay! 
Naysayers might also argue that underfunded training and budget 
cuts are the sole cause of all things broken (a misleading half-truth, at 
best), leaving the vast American public with a new normal presumption 
that the IRS is not to be trusted. So, act accordingly! 
In rebuttal, we need to be truly convincing as we point out that even 
though training and full-funding, across the board, are the mainstay of any 
sound organization, they alone cannot realistically be a substitute for 
geographically cohesive, state-based accountability and the development 
of a field-seasoned and cross-functional corps of field-based senior 
executives. 
Quite naturally, there are many false choices, but neither Hybrid 
FEOs streamlining the Service nor better training is among them! In fact, 
the Service actually needs them all, but these two can most assuredly be 
delivered as doable, low-budget items: (1) Streamlining—Hybrid FEOs, 
phased-in together with a discretely slimmed down National Office (while 
realigning the budget), should not be a high-budget item; and (2) training 
with inventive new delivery modes can make it also a modest-budget item. 
Thus, visibly turning around what’s good that went bad is always a 
good choice. One might ask, why harp on visibly? Well, that’s easy. 
Generally, half of public problems are misunderstood public perceptions, 
so fixing the perception should be at the top of any list. 
 
 88.  See Ronald Reagan, The Creative Society speech by Ronald Reagan, FREEREPUBLIC 
(Apr. 19, 1966), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/742041/posts (speaking at the University 
of Southern California when running for Governor of California). 
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Decentralizing, to gain a local presence (geographically closer to 
Main Street, Anycity), would certainly provide a more “populist” appeal 
and a more uplifting perception of progress than endlessly retooling 
unfixable stovepipes run by far-away puppet-masters in Washington, D.C. 
Now, what about the cost of restructuring and reform? Some 
observers contend that the IRS could do a better job with the resources 
that it has. Adding some credibility to that contention, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) believes that “[a] long-term 
strategy that includes a fundamental reexamination of IRS’s operations, 
program, and organizational structure could help it operate more 
effectively and efficiently in an environment of budget uncertainty.”89 
Others also persuasively contend that the agency is perilously 
underfunded no matter how it reallocates its resources. The message of 
this Article is neutral on the matter because, either way, the Service can 
still do its best at stemming its downward slide by rehabilitating and 
rebalancing field operations. 
D. Action—Reshape the Destiny of an Essential Agency 
Change-makers may not be able to control the budget; but they sure 
can control how the money is spent to improve what we already have. For 
the good of the Internal Revenue Service, it needs an urgent call to action 
for nationally visible proposals such as this Rebuild IRS Initiative. 
Like America, the IRS is a work in progress. For best results, it’s 
better to avoid thinking too much about what the IRS is. Instead, let’s 
think more about what it ought to be! Since this Article is just one 
initiative about what the IRS ought to be, we might briefly consider a few 
other fine initiatives already in place. Other initiatives include efforts to: 
 
1. Develop the idea of taxpayers having an “account” at the IRS 
where they, or their preparers, can log in securely, get all their 
information and interact with the IRS as needed; 
 
 89.  Jonathan B. Foreman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service Work, 
17 FLA. TAX REV. 725 (2015) (emphasis added) (presented at the 107th Annual Conference on 
Taxation of the National Tax Association in Santa Fe, New Mexico, November 15, 2014). See also 
id. at n. 471 (citing US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 14-605, IRS 2015 BUDGET: LONG-
TERM STRATEGY AND RETURN ON INV. DATA NEEDED TO BETTER MANAGE BUDGET 
UNCERTAINTY AND SET PRIORITIES, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664083.pdf); id. at n. 250, 
(citing William Hoffman, Koskinen Denies IRS Service Cuts Are a Protest Over Its Budget, 146 
TAX NOTES 339 (2015)). 
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2. Build a culture within the IRS that focuses on risk management 
and encourages the flow of information up from the front lines 
through the organization; 
3. Respond to concerns about the “brain drain” confronting the 
federal workforce as large numbers of workers and members of 
leadership head toward retirement; and 
4. Modernize and replace outdated IT infrastructure and 
technology.90 
 
Testing the potential “populist” impact of each will be up to others. 
However, venturing to speak on behalf of the Hybrid FEO, getting it done 
would likely unleash populist approval, which might even help game-
changing appeal with budgets and Congress. 
IX. CONCLUSION: BENDING THE CURVE FORWARD BECAUSE THE GOOD 
OF THE SERVICE AND NATION MATTERS 
Thus, this Article ends as it opened, calling for leaders and change-
makers to stand up assertively and make a difference. Rebuilding even 
part of the IRS is rebuilding a part of America; and that’s always good for 
the U.S.A.91 
By taking little notice of Internal Revenue Service makeover needs 
today, we place at risk no less than the survival of our voluntary self-
assessment approach to raising this nation’s revenue. 
Make no mistake; we are at peril if we underestimate the effect of 
too many angry taxpayers on voluntary compliance! From their perch, 
they see little being done to repair the damage that is rightly or wrongly 
portrayed to them in the press and on television. Sure, most people are 
honest, but the number of others is growing! And that’s directly traceable 
to not taking visible steps that make an encouraging impression on the 
vast taxpaying public at large. 
Let this conclusion be food for a new beginning! 
 
  90.  See Paul W. Raymond, IRS Commissioner cites successes of “new IRS” and challenges 
facing cash-strapped agency, ORANGE COUNTY TAX ATTORNEY (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://octaxlawattorney.com/irs-commissioner-cites-successes-of-new-irs-and-challenges-facing-
cash-strapped-agency/ (discussing the remarks of John A. Koskinen, IRS Commissioner, before the 
National Press Club, Washington, D.C. on March 31, 2015). 
 91.  See Steven J. Mopsick, Sixteen Years Later: Was the 1998 IRS Reorganization Good 
Government or Bad Government, MOPSICKTAXLAWBLOG (Nov. 3, 2014), 
http://mopsicktaxlaw.blogspot.com/2014/11/sixteen-years-later-was-1998-irs_3.html (observation, 
by an IRS veteran and former senior executive, that “Professor Wolpe has laid down a gauntlet for 
IRS reform; and it remains to be seen whether Washington has the guts to take it on.”).  
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